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3233 
ETHICAL ISSUES IN MASS TORT 
PLAINTIFFS’ REPRESENTATION:  BEYOND 
THE AGGREGATE SETTLEMENT RULE 
Nancy J. Moore* 
 
Those who have addressed ethics issues for plaintiffs’ lawyers in mass 
tort litigation have focused on possible reform of the aggregate settlement 
rule to facilitate global settlements.  This Article addresses a broader range 
of ethical issues, including (1) application of the general conflicts of 
interest rule to both client-client and client-lawyer conflicts; (2) unresolved 
issues concerning the interpretation of the current aggregate settlement 
rule, including the need to disclose client names and the applicability of the 
rule to court-approved settlements and formula or matrix allocations; and 
(3) the ability of lawyers to voluntarily withdraw from representing 
plaintiffs who reject an offer of settlement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Following the Supreme Court decisions in Amchem Products, Inc. v. 
Windsor1 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,2 plaintiffs’ attorneys largely 
shifted from using class actions to resolve large numbers of personal injury 
and other tort claims to using nonclass group litigation,3 including both 
formal and informal aggregations of individual claims,4 in which, unlike 
class actions,5 each claimant has a more-or-less traditional attorney-client 
relationship with the plaintiffs’ attorney.6  Although many of these claims 
are resolved individually—sometimes by trial and sometimes by 
settlement—it has become increasingly common for both plaintiffs’ and 
defendants’ attorneys to attempt to resolve large numbers of claims through 
negotiated settlements, including both a single, “global” resolution of 
virtually all claims7 and more limited resolutions of each plaintiffs’ 
attorney’s “inventory” of claims.8 
Neither courts, practitioners, nor scholars have focused much attention on 
the ethical issues confronting plaintiffs’ lawyers in the group representation 
of mass tort claimants.9  To the extent that they have, however, most of 
their concern has been with American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rule 
 
 1. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 2. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 3. See generally Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to 
Multidistrict Consolidations:  Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 775 (2010). 
 4. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 
(2009) (listing types of formal and informal aggregate litigation); see also, e.g., Howard M. 
Erichson, Informal Aggregation:  Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination 
Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381 (2000). 
 5. For a discussion of the relationship between class counsel and members of the class, 
see, for example, Nancy J. Moore, Who Should Regulate Class Action Lawyers?, 2003 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1477, 1482–89. 
 6. For ways in which the relationship between lawyer and client in mass tort 
representations involving large numbers of clients differs from the traditional representation 
of individual clients, see, for example, JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS 
TORT LITIGATION 85 (1995) (arguing that “[t]he mass tort lawyer cannot deal with his or her 
clients on a one-to-one basis that permits full client participation in the litigation”), and 
Nancy J. Moore, The Case Against Changing the Aggregate Settlement Rule in Mass Tort 
Lawsuits, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 149, 160–62 (1999) (discussing the challenges of reasonably 
communicating with large numbers of clients in mass tort representation). See also infra 
notes 89–101 and accompanying text (arguing that there should be some limitation on the 
number of clients represented by a single lawyer or law firm). 
 7. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 979, 980 (2010) (describing the desirability of a “global settlement as a value-
generating enterprise and the natural endgame of mass litigation”). 
 8. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers As Monitors in Aggregate 
Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1296–97 (2012); cf. Katherine Dirks, Note, Ethical 
Rules of Conduct in the Settlement of Mass Torts:  A Proposal To Revise Rule 1.8(g), 
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 501, 514 (2008) (discussing practitioners’ reference to multiple clients’ 
similar claims as their “inventory”). 
 9.  Nancy J. Moore, The Absence of Legal Ethics in the ALI’s Principles of the Law of 
Aggregate Litigation:  A Missed Opportunity—and More, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 717, 723–
33 (2011) (criticizing the ALI for failing to do more to educate lawyers concerning their 
ethical obligations in both class and nonclass aggregated litigation). 
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1.8(g)—the aggregate settlement rule—which provides that a lawyer 
representing multiple plaintiffs “shall not participate in making an 
aggregate settlement of the claims of . . . the client . . . unless each client 
gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client.”10  They have 
offered various definitions of an “aggregate settlement”11 and questioned 
precisely what information must be disclosed in satisfaction of the rule’s 
requirements.12  In addition, they have sometimes addressed the ethical 
propriety of the attempts by defense attorneys to indirectly achieve final 
resolution by inserting provisions in settlement agreements that prevent 
plaintiffs’ attorneys from taking on new clients with similar claims against 
the defendant.13  Such attempts raise questions concerning unethical 
restrictions on the right to practice,14 in violation of Model Rule 5.6(b), 
which prohibits a lawyer from offering or making “an agreement in which a 
restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part of the settlement of a 
client controversy.”15 
Most recently, ethics scholars have been preoccupied with attempts to 
make it easier to achieve global resolution through aggregate settlements by 
revising Rule 1.8(g) to permit plaintiffs to agree, in advance, to be bound by 
the decision of a majority or supermajority to accept the terms of an 
aggregate settlement.16  Courts and ethics committees have uniformly held 
that such advance waivers do not satisfy the current rule’s requirement that 
each client give consent after being informed of the particular terms of the 
proposed settlement.17  Critics of this requirement argue that it is 
 
 10. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2012). 
 11. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1769, 1795 (2005). See generally Mark J. Fucile, The Aggregate Settlement 
Rule:  A Rule in Search of a Definition, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 296 (2011). 
 12. Compare, e.g., Moore, supra note 6, at 164 (arguing that the current rule does not 
necessarily require the disclosure of client names in all cases), with Charles Silver & Lynn 
A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 
780 (1997) (arguing that the current rule requires the disclosure of the names of all client 
participants and the amount each will receive). See generally infra notes 155–66 and 
accompanying text (addressing the necessity of disclosing both client names and the actual 
amounts clients will receive when settlement utilizes a formula to be applied after settlement 
is approved). 
 13. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 
96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 279–92 (2011) (discussing the propriety of such a provision in the 
recent Vioxx settlement). 
 14. Id. 
 15. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6(b); see infra notes 22–27, 196–203 
accompanying text (discussing whether attorneys would violate Rule 5.6(b) if they complied 
with the applicable provision of the Vioxx settlement agreement). 
 16. E.g., Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 13; Nancy J. Moore, The American Law 
Institute’s Draft Proposal To Bypass the Aggregate Settlement Rule:  Do Mass Tort Clients 
Need (or Want) Group Decision Making?, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 395 (2008); Moore, supra 
note 6; Thomas D. Morgan, Client Representation vs. Case Administration:  The ALI Looks 
at Legal Ethics Issues in Aggregate Settlements, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 734 (2011); Silver 
& Baker, supra note 12; Kerrie M. Brophy, Note, Consent Waivers in Non-class Aggregate 
Settlements:  Respecting Risk Preference in a Transactional Adjudication Model, 22 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 677 (2009); Dirks, supra note 8. 
 17. See Morgan, supra note 16, at 741. 
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unnecessary and unduly burdensome, thereby preventing plaintiffs from 
fully realizing the potential benefits of aggregating their claims.18  These 
critics persuaded the American Law Institute (ALI)—in its recently adopted 
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation—to propose a rule change 
permitting claimants, in certain circumstances, to agree in advance to accept 
an aggregate settlement offer approved by a supermajority of similarly 
situated claimants.19  The ALI proposal was finalized in 2010, but to date 
no jurisdiction has adopted such a rule change.20 
Practitioners involved in group litigation, particularly defense attorneys, 
continue to search for ways to increase the likelihood of achieving a global 
resolution of all (or virtually all) claims.  In 2007, the pharmaceutical 
company Merck signed a $4.85 billion agreement with law firms 
representing over 33,000 claimants who were suing Merck for injuries 
allegedly caused by Vioxx.21  The agreement contained several 
controversial provisions requiring plaintiffs’ attorneys to recommend the 
settlement to all of their clients and to withdraw from representing any 
client who rejected the settlement.22  These provisions arguably violated 
state versions of ABA Model Rule 2.1, which requires lawyers to exercise 
independent professional judgment in advising their clients;23 ABA Model 
Rule 1.16,24 which prohibits lawyers from withdrawing from a 
representation without good cause when the result will be to materially 
prejudice the client;25 and ABA Model Rule 5.6, which prohibits settling 
attorneys from agreeing to restrict their right to practice.26 
Vioxx and other similar settlements27 raise important ethical issues 
beyond the aggregate settlement rule.  Nevertheless, neither practitioners 
nor scholars have adequately addressed the full range of ethical issues 
confronting plaintiffs’ attorneys representing large numbers of claimants in 
mass tort cases.  For example, although the aggregate settlement rule is 
 
 18. See, e.g., Silver & Baker, supra note 12, at 756–68.  
 19. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.17(b) (2010). 
 20. See N.J. SUPREME COURT PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY RULES COMM., 2010–2012 RULES 
CYCLE REPORT 41 (2012), available at http://op.bna.com/mopc.nsf/id/jros-8rskq8/$File/
NJ%20PRRC2010-12RPT.pdf. 
 21. David Voreacos & Allen Johnson, Merck Paid 3,468 Death Claims To Resolve 
Vioxx Suits, BLOOMBERG.COM (July 27, 2010, 5:27 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2010-07-27/merck-paid-3-468-death-claims-to-resolve-vioxx-suits.html. 
 22. See, e.g., Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 13, at 280–81.  With respect to the 
mandatory withdrawal provision, the agreement did provide the caveat that attorneys were 
not required to withdraw unless ethically permitted to do so under state equivalents of Rules 
1.16 and 5.6 of the ABA Model Rules. See id. at 290.  I agree with Erichson and Zipursky 
that, even with this caveat, this provision was unethical, although not for the same reasons 
they give. See infra Part III. 
 23. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2012) (“In representing a client, a lawyer 
shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.”). 
 24. Id. R. 1.16 (providing for required and permissive withdrawal from representation).  
 25. See, e.g., Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 13, at 283–85 (also discussing probable 
violations of Rules 1.2(a), 1.4, and 5.6(b)). 
 26. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 27. For a discussion of several recent settlements that raise significant ethical issues, see 
Erichson, supra note 7. 
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generally understood as a special application of general conflicts of interest 
rules (as well as rules specifying that it is for the client, not the lawyer, to 
determine whether to accept or reject a settlement), there is little 
understanding as to how these general conflicts of interest rules apply to 
plaintiffs’ lawyers prior to an aggregate settlement proposal, either at the 
outset of an individual representation or as the representation develops.28  
At what point does a conflict of interest arise?  Are any such conflicts ever 
nonconsentable, either at the beginning of a representation or as events 
unfold?  What specific disclosures are lawyers required to make in order to 
assure that client consent is adequately informed?  Are additional 
disclosures required as the representation evolves? 
As for the specific issues raised by the Vioxx settlement agreement, 
commentators generally agree that it was improper for defense attorneys to 
require (and for plaintiffs’ attorneys to agree) that the plaintiffs’ attorneys 
would recommend the settlement to all their clients29 and would withdraw 
from the representation of any client who rejected the settlement.30  Even in 
the absence of such heavy-handed provisions, however, the question 
remains how plaintiffs’ attorneys can possibly exercise independent 
judgment in advising individual claimants whether to accept an aggregate 
settlement when defense attorneys require (as they are clearly permitted to 
do) that the settlement will be ineffective for any claimant unless all or a 
specified percentage of claimants agree to participate.  And what if a 
plaintiffs’ attorney cannot afford to continue representing only a few 
clients—or even one—who reject the settlement and insist on going to trial?  
Aside from what defense attorneys want them to do, is there no way that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys can protect themselves against the possibility that they 
will be unable to spread the costs of any ongoing representation among a 
large number of clients? 
In this Article, I address a broader range of ethical issues confronting 
plaintiffs’ attorneys in mass tort cases than is usually found in the writings 
of either practitioners or scholars.  Part I addresses various underanalyzed 
applications of the general conflicts of interest rule, including not only 
 
 28. See infra Part I.A. 
 29. See, e.g., PAUL D. RHEINGOLD, LITIGATING MASS TORT CASES § 14:13:50 (Supp. 
2012); Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 13, at 283–84.  It has been pointed out to me that 
the pressure placed on attorneys as a result of the mandatory recommendation provision was 
lessened by the existence of a provision, typically overlooked by commentators, for an 
“extraordinary injury fund” (EIF), by which clients could seek additional compensation if 
they were dissatisfied with their compensation under the matrix formula. See Settlement 
Agreement Between Merck Co., Inc. and the Counsel Listed on the Signature Pages Hereto 
§ 4.2 (Nov. 9, 2007), available at http://www.legalexaminer.com/uploadedFiles/InjuryBoard
com_Content/Overviews/VioxxMasterSettlementAgreement.pdf.  This provision made it 
easier for attorneys to exercise their independent judgment in favor of recommending the 
settlement to their clients. 
 30. See, e.g., RHEINGOLD, supra note 29, § 14:13:50; Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 
13, at 285–92.  As noted earlier, the requirement to withdraw was limited to situations in 
which such withdrawal was ethically permissible. See supra note 25.  Nevertheless, 
commentators have generally concluded that the provision was still unethical. See infra Part 
III. 
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conflicts among different plaintiffs and plaintiff groups but also conflicts 
between the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs’ attorney.  Part II briefly addresses 
continuing difficulties in defining an aggregate settlement for purposes of 
Rule 1.8(g).  It also addresses the significance of a variation of the rule 
adopted in at least two states, which appears to provide that the rule does 
not apply when an aggregate nonclass settlement receives court approval, as 
it did in the Vioxx settlement.31  With respect to the disclosure provisions of 
the current rule, questions remain whether the rule requires each client to be 
advised of the name of, and amount being allocated to, every other client; 
these requirements may impinge not only on the legitimate privacy interests 
of some clients but also on the ability of the parties to enter into a 
settlement agreement when the specific allocations have not yet been 
made—for example, when an independent third person will subsequently 
make the individual allocations, typically based on a formula or matrix 
described in the agreement.  Finally, Part III addresses the ability of 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to withdraw from the representation of one or more 
clients who decline to accept an aggregate settlement offer when the 
expenses of the representation cannot be spread among a large number of 
clients. 
I.  CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
It is generally acknowledged that Rule 1.8(g)—the aggregate settlement 
rule—represents a special application of both Rule 1.7—the general 
conflicts of interest rule—and Rule 1.2(a), which provides that a lawyer 
must abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.32  What is less 
often recognized is that Rule 1.8(g) merely supplements Rule 1.7, but does 
not supplant it,33 meaning that it is possible for a plaintiffs’ attorney to 
violate Rule 1.7 in negotiating and recommending an aggregate settlement 
to a disparate group of plaintiffs even though the attorney has strictly 
complied with the requirements of Rule 1.8(g).  Even more surprising, 
however, is the failure of most commentators to address the application of 
Rule 1.7 at earlier stages of the representation, beginning with the 
acceptance of each new client and continuing through the various stages of 
the representation.  The representation might conclude with an aggregate 
settlement (including all or part of the attorney’s clients) or it might 
conclude with one or more individual trials to verdict or settlements of 
 
 31. See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 13, at 296–97. 
 32. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 13 (2012); Brophy, supra 
note 16, at 680. 
 33. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 438 (2006).  
For an illustration of commentaries that appear to assume that the conflicts that arise with 
respect to aggregate settlements are addressed solely or primarily by Rule 1.8(g), without 
any discussion of the applicability of Rule 1.7 either at the outset of the representation or 
when negotiating an aggregate settlement, see Robert I. Komitor, Mediation and Settlement 
of the Multiparty Action—When Ethical Considerations Clash with Case Resolution, 2001 
ATLA-CLE 2785; J. Michal Papantonio, The Ethics of Mass Tort Settlement, 2002 ATLA-
CLE 2617; Brophy, supra note 16; Dirks, supra note 8. 
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individual cases, or with some combination of individual trials, settlements 
of individual cases, and aggregate settlements.34 
A.  Conflicts at the Outset of the Representation 
Rule 1.7(a) provides that a concurrent conflict of interest exists when 
“the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client”35 
(a “directly adverse conflict”), or when “there is a significant risk that the 
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the 
lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person, 
or by a personal interest of the lawyer” (a “material limitation conflict”).36 
It is rarely the case that mass tort claimants in similar types of cases will be 
directly adverse to each other, as would happen if one claimant-client sued 
another claimant-client, typically in an unrelated matter, or if one appeared 
as a witness against another and the lawyer had to cross-examine the client-
claimant witness on behalf of the client-claimant party.37  These scenarios 
are highly remote.  What is more likely, however, is that the representation 
of one claimant, or one type of claimant, will be materially limited by the 
representation of other claimants, or other types of claimants.38  This is the 
client-client conflict that most lawyers understand is present when a 
plaintiffs’ attorney negotiates an aggregate settlement.  Indeed, it is 
precisely this type of conflict that underlies the aggregate settlement rule.39  
In addition, some courts and commentators have expressed concern that 
there are client-lawyer conflicts arising from financial and other interests of 
 
 34. Several commentators discuss the applicability of Rule 1.7 at the outset of the 
representation when the lawyer is accepting new clients. See, e.g., RHEINGOLD, supra note 
29, § 14:17; Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 13, at 304–11; Howard M. Erichson, Beyond 
the Class Action:  Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-class Collective 
Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 558–67. See generally Sarah A. Toops, 
Ethically Representing Thousands of Plaintiffs:  Conflict Problems in Mass Toxic Harm 
Cases, 67 DEF. COUNS. J. 462 (2000).  Much of this commentary focuses solely on the nature 
of the disclosure the lawyer must make in order to obtain the informed consent of the clients 
to the conflicts inherent in mass representation. See, e.g., Matthew L. Garretson, A Practical 
Approach to Proactive Client-Counseling and Avoiding Conflicts of Interest in Aggregate 
Settlements, 6 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 19, 30–33 (2005); cf. In re Hoffman, 883 So. 2d 425, 425 
(La. 2004) (holding that an attorney violated Rule 1.7(b) by failing to obtain the informed 
consent of two clients to the joint representation and also violated Rule 1.8(g) by failing to 
consult with all his clients with respect to the details of the proposed aggregate settlement).  
Commentators rarely address conflicts that arise subsequent to intake, perhaps assuming that 
if the lawyer obtains informed consent at the outset, this consent covers conflicts that arise 
subsequently, including the actual negotiation of an aggregate settlement, which is also 
addressed by Rule 1.8(g). 
 35. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2012). 
 36. Id. R. 1.7(a)(2). 
 37. See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 6. 
 38. Material limitation conflicts arise “if there is a significant risk that a lawyer’s ability 
to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be 
materially limited as a result of the lawyer’s other responsibilities or interest.” Id. cmt. 8.  In 
other words, “[t]he conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available 
to the client.” Id. 
 39. See id. R. 1.8 cmt. 13; ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 
438 (2006). 
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plaintiffs’ attorneys in mass tort litigation, particularly when the attorney 
has incurred massive debt in pursuing the litigation.40  I will address both 
types of conflicts, first with respect to conflict identification under Rule 
1.7(a)41 and then under the provisions of Rule 1.7(b), which permit lawyers 
to undertake conflicted representations with the informed consent of the 
clients, except when the conflict is nonconsentable.42 
1.  Conflict Identification:  Client-Client Conflicts 
At the time an aggregate settlement is negotiated, plaintiffs’ attorneys in 
mass tort cases typically represent a variety of clients who differ with 
respect to disease category, extent of injury, length of exposure, date of 
injury or manifestation of injury, medical history, and other factors bearing 
on the strength of their claims and the size of their potential recoveries.43  In 
addition, they differ with respect to their litigation goals, including their 
tolerance for risk, preferred remedies, interest in process values, and desire 
for vindication at trial.44  All of these factors have an obvious bearing on 
the clients’ willingness to accept an aggregate settlement,45 with respect to 
both the size of the total amount and its allocation among the various 
claimants.  Thus, it is obvious that, at the time of responding to an 
aggregate settlement offer, the obligation of the plaintiffs’ attorney to 
enhance the recovery of any one claimant, or type of claimant, will 
materially limit the ability of the lawyer to enhance the recovery of other 
claimants, or types of claimants, thereby triggering a material limitation 
conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(a).46  But is this same conflict triggered 
at the outset of each representation, when it may be unclear whether the 
time will come when the lawyer will be faced with the conflicts that are 
generated by an aggregate settlement proposal? 
Professor Howard Erichson, one of the few commentators to address in 
any detail the application of the general conflicts rule to a mass tort 
lawyer’s initial acceptance of clients, has argued that conflicts of interest 
among current clients are inherent in mass tort representation because the 
 
 40. See infra notes 64–69 and accompanying text. 
 41. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
 42. See infra notes 75–80 and accompanying text. 
 43. See, e.g., Komitor, supra note 33 (noting that differences exist among “clients with 
injuries ranging from the less significant, such as non-disabling pleural plaques to the more 
severe, such as disabling asbestosis and malignancies”; other differences “include a variety 
of competing interests such as category and severity of disease and ability to identify the 
source of asbestos exposure”); see also, e.g., Toops, supra note 34, at 462 (potential 
differences also include jurisdictional interests). 
 44. See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 34, at 574; Toops, supra note 34, at 463. 
 45. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 438 (2006). 
 46. But see, e.g., Allegretti-Freeman v. Baltis, 613 N.Y.S.2d 449, 451 (App. Div. 1994) 
(refusing to recognize the existence of a conflict of interest among seventeen homeowners, 
who brought an action against a real estate developer and broker based on alleged structural 
defects and contaminated water in their homes, unless some in fact desired to accept the 
aggregate settlement offer and would be prevented from doing so by the objections of others 
to the offer). 
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plaintiffs’ interests are not perfectly aligned.47  As a result, lawyers 
representing multiple plaintiffs will inevitably face decisions about whose 
interests to advance at various stages of the litigation, including decisions 
concerning how to prioritize among litigation objectives, which cases to 
push to trial first, and whether to support wide-ranging confidentiality 
agreements and protective orders in individual cases.  Erichson has 
therefore advocated that plaintiffs’ attorneys recognize and deal with these 
conflicts at the outset of the representation, rather than waiting for specific 
issues to arise during the litigation. 
Not all practitioners agree.  Erichson’s argument is based on his 
assumption that the lawyer knows at the outset of a mass tort representation 
that the representation will be “collective” in nature.  Others view each 
representation as individual, unless and until either the plaintiffs’ or the 
defendants’ attorney decides to address these cases collectively, as in the 
negotiation of an aggregate settlement.48 
Erichson’s argument has merit in many, perhaps even most, mass tort 
representations.  Many lawyers aim from the beginning to take on hundreds, 
thousands, or even tens of thousands of claimants, regardless of the type or 
extent of their injuries or any other factor likely to affect the strength of 
their claims or the size of their potential recoveries.49  The most thoughtful 
of these lawyers know that they will be treating the clients as a group, that 
they will focus on monetary rather than nonmonetary goals in all cases, that 
they will design the litigation strategy to maximize the size of any overall 
recovery, and that, in the likely event that they will ultimately negotiate an 
aggregate settlement, they will attempt to allocate the proceeds in a manner 
that is generally fair but that inevitably will sacrifice the interests of some to 
the interests of others.50  Such a strategy may be ethically permissible but, 
as Erichson suggests, there is a “significant risk” from the very outset of 
these representations that the representation of some clients will be 
 
 47. See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 34, at 573.  Others have addressed the issue, but not at 
the same level of detail. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 
33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 833, 847–48 (2005); Toops, supra note 34, at 463. 
 48. Cf. RHEINGOLD, supra note 29, § 14:3 (discussing particular scenarios in which 
conflicts may arise).  I have had discussions with various plaintiffs’ lawyers who insist that 
there is not necessarily a conflict of interest in representing multiple plaintiffs in mass tort 
actions and that they treat cases as individual and not collective unless the defendant decides 
to treat them collectively.  These lawyers typically are more selective and choose to 
represent only a limited number of potentially high-value cases. See infra note 52 and 
accompanying text. 
 49. See, e.g., Komitor, supra note 33. 
 50. There may be some, perhaps many, settlements in which individual claimants are 
treated fairly under an objective matrix that accurately reflects the litigation value of cases of 
various types.  Nevertheless, it is likely that attorneys representing only one, or one type, of 
claimant would have at least argued for differences in the way the matrix was formulated to 
favor their client(s)’ interests.  With multiple clients with different types of cases, I continue 
to believe, along with Erichson, that the interests of some get sacrificed to the interests of 
others.  This is not necessarily wrong or even unfair; it simply suggests that representing 
multiple clients in mass tort litigation typically presents conflicts of interest that must be 
addressed under conflict of interest rules. 
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“materially limited” by the attorneys’ obligations to other clients, thereby 
presenting a Rule 1.7 conflict.51 
But this is not what all mass tort plaintiffs’ attorneys envision.  Some 
plan to accept only a limited number of high-value cases, that is, cases in 
which the plaintiff appears to have both a strong case for liability and very 
serious injuries.52  Inevitably there will be differences among even these 
plaintiffs,53 but that does not necessarily mean that there is a significant risk 
of material limitation as a result of these differences.54  For example, at the 
early stages of a particular mass tort, before it becomes apparent how 
widespread the injuries or claims will be or whether the defendants will be 
unable to fully compensate all victims (or at least all of the victims 
represented by this particular attorney), the risk that the attorney’s loyalty to 
one client will limit her loyalty to another client may be remote.  Each case 
may proceed on its own course, with the attorney making decisions in each 
case, in consultation with the client, as to what strategy is in that client’s 
best interest.  There may be little likelihood that a strategic decision in  one 
case will materially limit what the attorney can do in another case.  In these 
situations, the attorney may plausibly argue that the risk of material 
limitation is insufficient at the outset to trigger the conflicts of interest rule. 
What about the fact that the plaintiffs’ attorneys will almost certainly 
plan to hire experts who are expected to serve in all or most of their clients’ 
cases?  Given that there will be important similarities in establishing the 
defendant’s liability, including the need to develop proof of negligence, 
product defect, or general causation, it seems inevitable that the attorney’s 
multiple clients will be sharing many of the costs of the representation.  
Nevertheless, the prospect of cost sharing is a potential benefit, not a 
potential detriment of the multiple representation, as is the leverage the 
attorney gains as a result of the defendant’s awareness that the attorney has 
more resources at her disposal than if she were representing only one 
claimant.55  Unless it can be demonstrated that the representation of 
multiple plaintiffs also presents a significant likelihood that any one 
representation will be adversely affected by the others, it would appear that 
there are no material limitation conflicts in this situation, at least at the 
beginning of the representation. 
Nevertheless, Erichson is surely correct that for most mass tort 
representations, a material limitation conflict of interest arises among the 
many clients of a plaintiffs’ attorney—a conflict that must be dealt with at 
the outset of the representation. 
 
 51. Erichson, supra note 34, at 558. 
 52. See, e.g., Komitor, supra note 33. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 cmt. d(i) 
(stating that there is not always a conflict for a lawyer representing multiple plaintiffs). 
 55. See, e.g., Silver & Baker, supra note 12, at 745. 
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2.  Conflict Identification:  Client-Lawyer Conflicts 
In a recent mass tort litigation involving over 10,000 cases filed by 
responders who participated in the clean-up of the World Trade Center 
disaster site, one law firm, Worby Groner Edelman & Napoli Bern LLP 
(Napoli Bern), represented over 90 percent of the plaintiffs.56  Pursuant to 
federal legislation, all the cases were filed in or transferred to the Southern 
District of New York.  Presiding Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein exercised 
extensive judicial supervision over all aspects of the litigation,57 which 
ultimately resulted in Judge Hellerstein approving a comprehensive 
aggregate settlement of almost all the claims.58  Judge Hellerstein justified 
his strong managerial role, including his rejection of the first proposed 
settlement agreement, by noting not only the potential conflicts among so 
many plaintiffs represented by a single law firm59 but also a substantial 
conflict arising from the law firm’s own “compelling interest” in having the 
settlement approved.60  Napoli Bern, a relatively small firm, had spent eight 
years strenuously litigating these cases, including two appeals, without any 
compensation.61  The firm had borrowed heavily, incurring a large interest 
expense, which was secured by personal guaranties of the firm’s 
principals.62  As a result, Judge Hellerstein concluded that the prospect of 
settlement and an anticipated fee of $250 million, plus expenses, “gave the 
firm an interest that may not have been in line with many of its clients’ 
interests.”63  Subsequently, writing about mass torts generally, Judge 
Hellerstein continued to express concern over mass tort lawyers’ financial 
incentives: 
Their need to finance their cases over several years of hard-fought and 
expensive litigation creates substantial debts, financed at high compound 
interest rates.  Repayment of the loans tends to depend on settlements or 
recoveries in the lawsuits, the outcomes of which tend to be far from 
certain.  These debts create powerful motivations that potentially can 
 
 56. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 769 F. Supp. 2d 650, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
 57. See generally Alvin K. Hellerstein, James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, 
Managerial Judging:  The 9/11 Responders’ Tort Litigation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 127, 129 
n.30 (2012).  
 58. See id. at 170–71.  For a discussion of the claims that were omitted from the 
settlement, see infra notes 129–31 and accompanying text. 
 59. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 184, 196–97 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Since one law firm . . . represented the substantial majority of the 
Plaintiffs, and since a normal attorney-client relationship cannot function where one lawyer 
represents so many clients, each with varying and diverse interests, judicial review must 
exist to assure fairness and to prevent overreaching.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Alvin K. 
Hellerstein, Democratization of Mass-Tort Litigation:  Presiding over Mass Tort Litigation 
To Enhance Participation and Control by the People Whose Claims Are Being Asserted, 
45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 473, 477 (2012) (concluding that “only the court can ensure 
that conflicts arising in the representation do not unfairly harm plaintiffs”). 
 60. World Trade Center, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 197–98. 
 61. Id. at 198. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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interfere with the lawyer’s professional obligation to serve clients’ 
interests first and foremost.64 
Judge Hellerstein is not alone in suggesting that a client-lawyer conflict 
exists when plaintiffs’ attorneys invest substantial funds of their own 
money, or take on extensive debt, in order to finance costly mass tort 
litigation.65  And surely it is beyond dispute that both a firm’s need to be 
reimbursed for its advanced expenses (which can be extraordinarily high in 
a mass tort case), as well as the prospect of a multimillion dollar fee (when 
proving the defendant’s liability is far from certain, and a settlement’s 
rejection could result in a total loss), provide “powerful motivations” for a 
firm to stray (wittingly or unwittingly) from its fiduciary duty to consider 
only the clients’ interests when responding to a particular settlement offer.  
And if the nature of a mass tort is such that these financial incentives are 
reasonably foreseeable from the outset, then don’t these incentives create a 
material limitation conflict of interest under Rule 1.7? 
Judge Hellerstein did not specify whether the client-lawyer conflicts he 
was describing constituted material limitation conflicts under Rule 1.7, such 
that any failure to adequately address such a conflict under the provisions of 
that rule would justify the discipline of the attorneys involved.  Indeed, 
there is reason to question whether these types of financial conflicts are 
subject to Rule 1.7. 
Elsewhere I have argued that conflict-of-interest rules such as Rule 1.7 
do “not purport to regulate circumstances that are common to all lawyers, 
but only those circumstances unique to specific lawyers.”66  In other words, 
“conflict-of-interest doctrine in law does not address largely unavoidable 
conflicts, but only those that can be avoided or removed by permitting (or 
requiring) clients to seek out other lawyers, that is, lawyers who are not 
burdened with a particular conflict of interest.”67  Specifically addressing 
the financial incentives resulting from potentially enormous fees, such as 
when class counsel is considering settlement offers, I concluded that such 
conflicts are not governed by Rule 1.7; rather, they constitute a type of 
agency problem that permeates legal and other professional practice and 
must be controlled either by other rules (such as Rule 1.5, which governs 
legal fees) or by “relying on lawyers’ professionalism and their willingness 
to exercise good judgment and self-restraint.”68 
Of course, it might be argued that, although “potentially enormous fees” 
are common to all law firms representing extremely large numbers of 
individual claimants in mass tort litigation, the enormous debt that 
confronts firms such as Napoli Bern is not necessarily shared by other 
 
 64. Hellerstein, supra note 59, at 474. 
 65. See, e.g., RHEINGOLD, supra note 29, § 14.3; Burch, supra note 8, at 1280; Toops, 
supra note 34, at 473–74. 
 66. Nancy J. Moore, What Doctors Can Learn from Lawyers About Conflicts of Interest, 
81 B.U. L. REV. 445, 451 (2001). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Moore, supra note 5, at 1490. 
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plaintiffs’ firms.69  Thus, perhaps the debt itself, including the potential for 
personal liability of the firm’s partners, created a financial interest of the 
plaintiffs’ attorney subject to Rule 1.7.  But it can also be argued that there 
are a myriad of financial circumstances that may confront individual 
lawyers or law firms—such as an individual lawyer’s uncovered medical 
expenses or investment losses or a law firm’s impending bankruptcy—
which create powerful incentives to compromise the representation of the 
clients.  Must all these circumstances be treated as conflicts of interest 
under Rule 1.7, which requires either declining the representation or 
disclosure to clients? Or are these “conflicts” simply different 
manifestations of the many types of financial pressures that may cause 
lawyers to depart from their proper role as faithful agents of their client-
principals?  These are difficult questions for which I do not have a clear 
answer.  At this point, however, all I want to suggest is that Rule 1.7 does 
not necessarily govern these sorts of financial incentives. 
Aside from the prospect of enormous legal fees (with or without the need 
to repay substantial debt), differences in an attorney’s fee agreements with 
clients or with referring lawyers can also create conflicts between plaintiffs’ 
attorneys and their clients.  For example, in a case involving an aggregate 
settlement of over 5,000 claims arising from the ingestion of “fen-phen” 
diet drugs, the Napoli Bern law firm was once again under attack.70  This 
time, a group of former clients who had been represented by Napoli Bern in 
the settlement claimed that other “Napoli Firm clients were offered 
disproportionately larger settlements because the firm unfairly inflated 
settlement offers for [these other] clients so that the attorneys’ fees earned 
by the firm would be greater.”71  The incentive to do so arose from the fact 
that these former clients had been referred by other lawyers who would be 
paid a referral fee from the fees obtained by Napoli on their settlements, 
whereas Napoli could keep all of the legal fees from clients who came 
directly to Napoli.72 
When, if ever, are fee differences among claimants subject to conflict-of-
interest rules?  Such differences arise not only from the need to pay referral 
fees on behalf of some, but not all, clients (and with respect to claimants 
with referral fees, the size of the referral fee may be different with respect 
to each referring lawyer) but also from possible differences in the size of 
 
 69. See MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS:  THE CHALLENGES OF 
MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 216–17 (1996) (discussing plaintiffs’ attorney 
Chesley’s financing of MDL-486 litigation, investing $1 million of his own money for 
expenses in preparation for trial and concluding that, “[w]hile the contingent fee system 
necessarily results in plaintiffs’ attorneys having a financial stake in the case and sometimes 
results in a conflict between client and attorney, an investment of the magnitude of Chesley’s 
is highly unusual”). 
 70. See In re N.Y. Diet Drug Litig., No. 700000/98, 2007 WL 969426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Mar. 27, 2007).  The firm was then known as Napoli Kaiser & Bern. Id. at *1. 
 71. Id. at *2. 
 72. Id. at *1; see also Garretson, supra note 34, at 21 (noting that mass tort clients come 
to lawyers from a referral network of other attorneys that typically have separate and distinct 
fee agreements). 
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the contingent fee each client has agreed to pay.  These differences may be 
the result of individual negotiations or they may reflect statutory or court 
imposed caps on contingent fees in personal injury cases in some 
jurisdictions.73  These client-lawyer conflicts may be especially pernicious 
because they affect not so much the attorney’s incentive to settle for a lower 
total amount than might be achieved with further litigation (as is generally 
the case with client-lawyer conflicts in class actions and mass tort lawsuits), 
but rather the lawyer’s incentive to improperly adjust the allocation of the 
total amount among the clients themselves for the lawyer’s own benefit. 
Fee-difference conflicts are not common to all lawyers.  Nevertheless, it 
is not clear that they necessarily create client-lawyer conflicts under Rule 
1.7, because the risk of material limitation may not be significant.  Whether 
the risk is real or remote may depend on the ease with which an attorney 
can adjust a settlement (or other aspect of the multiple representation) to 
favor certain clients over others based on the differences in their fee 
arrangements.  For example, if the plaintiffs’ attorney will be given a lump 
sum to allocate as he or she sees fit, without the use of a formula, matrix, or 
other objective criteria, there may be a significant likelihood that the lawyer 
will be tempted to favor certain clients based on prospective legal fees.  On 
the other hand, if the plaintiffs’ attorney negotiates a settlement where the 
allocation will be based on objective factors, and the factors appear to be 
evenly distributed among the different client groups, then the prospect of 
the attorney favoring any particular group based on fee differences is likely 
to be remote.  In any event, because it will be difficult to know at the outset 
of the representation whether such fee differences are likely to materially 
limit the lawyer’s representation, I conclude that such differences do not 
present a Rule 1.7 conflict at the outset, but may do so at some later point in 
the representation.  The same could also be said of the financial incentives 
of firms like Napoli Bern that incur substantial and unusual debt; that is, 
there is no Rule 1.7 conflict unless and until the firm should reasonably 
know that it is likely to incur debt far more onerous than is typically 
undertaken by a similarly situated law firm, taking into account such factors 
as the number of clients the firm anticipates accepting, the likely expense of 
litigating the particular mass tort, and the ability of the firm to finance the 
litigation without taking on unduly burdensome debt.74 
 
 
 73. See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 1:21-7(c) (providing for sliding scale percentage recoveries in 
contingent fee personal injury actions); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-251c (2009) (establishing 
maximum percentages—up to one-third—that clients may be charged as contingent legal 
fees in personal injury, wrongful death, and property damage cases). 
 74. One commentator argues that financial conflicts between lawyer and client may be 
reduced by relaxing restrictions against third-party litigation financing. See generally Burch, 
supra note 8. 
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3.  Consentability of the Conflicts 
Under Model Rule 1.7(b), a lawyer may represent a client 
notwithstanding the presence of a material limitation conflict if: 
(1)  the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide 
competent and diligent representation to each affected client; 
(2)  the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one 
client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same 
litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and 
(4)  each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.75 
The first three conditions collectively constitute what is commonly referred 
to as the “consentability” of the conflict.76  In other words, if these 
conditions are not satisfied, then the lawyer must decline or end the 
representation and may not ask the clients to give their consent to the 
conflict.  In the case of mass tort plaintiffs’ representation, there should be 
no question concerning the satisfaction of conditions (2) and (3).  The 
fundamental question is whether condition (1) can be satisfied; that is, 
whether it is reasonable for the lawyer to believe that the lawyer can 
competently and diligently represent each client. 
There has been little discussion of the consentability of the conflicts of 
interest that arise in mass tort representations.  Professor Lester Brickman, 
acknowledging the existence of conflicts in representing large numbers of 
asbestos claimants, says that he is “unaware of any widespread practice of 
plaintiff lawyers of seeking informed consent to such conflicts,” and further 
notes that, “[e]ven were these conditions to be complied with, serious 
questions exist as to whether a waiver from litigants so recruited would be 
valid under Model Rule 1.7(b)(1).”77  Sarah Toops similarly notes the 
existence of conflicts in representing mass tort plaintiffs.78  She also 
contends, without further explanation, that “[m]ost instances of conflicts 
produced by the diverging interest of an attorney’s clients in a mass toxic 
harms case cannot qualify for the exception set forth in the Model Rules 
because the lawyer usually cannot ‘reasonably believe’ that the 
representation will not be adversely affected.”79  On the contrary, however, 
 
 75. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2012). 
 76. See, e.g., id. at cmt. 15. 
 77. Brickman, supra note 47, at 859 n.113.  Brickman’s views may be inaccurate or out 
of date.  It is possible that it has become increasingly common for mass tort lawyers to 
include a standard provision in their retainer agreement that the clients understand that their 
case may be litigated or settled as part of a group of similar cases represented by that lawyer 
or firm. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Meadows, Nos. A094750, A095475, 2002 WL 31033065, at 
*1 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2002) (discussed at infra note 100 and accompanying text). 
 78. Toops, supra note 34, at 463–65. 
 79. Id. at 463–64.  Prior to the rule’s amendment in 2002, Rule 1.7(b)(1) provided that a 
lawyer may not accept representation when there is a material limitation conflict unless “the 
lawyer reasonably believes that the representation will not be adversely affected” by the 
conflict. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1) (2001).  The change in wording 
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Paul Rheingold believes that plaintiffs’ attorneys may properly represent 
many clients in mass tort litigation, citing ABA opinions suggesting that 
some conflicts can be resolved by an appropriate waiver, as well as another 
commentator who concludes that, under the Model Rules, group 
representation is banned only when there is “fundamental antagonism” 
among the plaintiffs.80 
Erichson is the one commentator who, both alone and with his coauthor, 
Professor Benjamin Zipursky, has addressed the question at some length, 
concluding that, in most situations involving mass tort litigation, multiple 
representation ought to be permitted with appropriate disclosure and client 
consent.81  In response to critics such as Toops, who query whether a 
lawyer can ever reasonably believe that the representation of at least some 
clients will not be adversely affected, Erichson posits that the clients’ 
consent in such cases functions as “an express limitation on the scope of 
representation” under Rule 1.2(c),82 which provides that “[a] lawyer may 
limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the 
circumstances and the client gives informed consent.”83  The nature of the 
limitation is that the clients are expressly opting for group representation, 
rather than the more traditional individual representation; that is, they are 
agreeing to representation in which the lawyer will “seek primarily to 
advance the interests of the group, as in a class action.”84 
Explaining why it is reasonable for mass tort clients to prefer group 
representation to individual representation, Erichson and Zipursky conclude 
that, in most cases, client interests are well served by a lawyer who 
represents many clients collectively, including in the negotiation of an 
aggregate settlement: 
By offering clients the benefits of leverage and economies of scale, 
collective representation offers the only practical way for plaintiffs in 
mass litigation to litigate on a level field against a defendant who invests 
in the litigation based on the aggregate stakes. . . .  Because of the benefits 
of collective representation and settlement, the conflicts involved . . . 
generally should be consentable.85 
Elsewhere, Erichson acknowledges that class actions may require 
subclasses when a single class purports to include claimants with 
 
was not intended to clarify or change the substance of the consentability provision of the 
rule. See ABA Comm’n on Evaluation of the Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Reporter’s 
Explanation of Changes, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional
_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission/e2k_rule17rem.html (last visited Apr. 19, 
2013). 
 80. RHEINGOLD, supra note 29, § 14:3. 
 81. See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 34, at 553–75; Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 13, at 
311–20. 
 82. Erichson, supra note 34, at 563. 
 83. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2012). 
 84. Erichson, supra note 34, at 529. 
 85. Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 13, at 305.  The authors are talking here about the 
conflicts involved in aggregate settlements, but the principle should also apply at the outset 
of the multiple representation, when the risks are more remote. 
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significantly differing interests, but he dismisses any argument that separate 
groups are required in nonclass aggregation any time subclasses would be 
required in a class action.86  He contends that this argument makes no sense 
because “class actions bind absent class members” and, therefore, “they 
require greater coherence.”87  According to Erichson:  
[I]ndividual informed consent to potential conflicts of interest should 
make it possible, in some circumstances, for attorneys to represent groups 
of plaintiffs with generally aligned but somewhat conflicting interests, 
even where those conflicting interests would make it impossible to 
represent the larger group in a single class action without subclasses.88 
I agree with Erichson and Zipursky that it is generally reasonable for 
mass tort plaintiffs to choose to litigate collectively rather than individually, 
and that there are sufficient differences between class actions and nonclass 
aggregations to warrant allowing some combinations of claims that might 
require subclasses if the group were an actual class.  This conclusion does 
not necessarily mean, however, that there should be no limitation on either 
the size or the composition of the group.  For example, was it reasonable in 
the World Trade Center litigation for clients to agree to be represented in a 
group comprised of 10,000 or more members?89  Is it reasonable for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to combine a small number of high-value claims along 
with a disproportionate number of weak claims?90 
Having a large number of claimants clearly enhances the ability of a 
group to “litigate at the highest level, including spending money on 
investigation and retention of top experts.”91  But is it necessary for a single 
attorney to represent 10,000 or more claimants to obtain that ability?  Is it 
even necessary for a single attorney, or even a single law firm, to have all of 
the resources necessary to “litigate at the highest level?”  After all, it is a 
common practice for multiple plaintiffs’ attorneys, each representing a 
separate group of claimants, to pool their resources, divide the work, and 
share the results of their efforts.92  In such cases, the multiple attorneys will 
compete with each other to obtain clients, possibly resulting in reduced 
legal fees and improved client service.  In addition, multiple attorneys can 
 
 86. See Erichson, supra note 34, at 565. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text. 
 90. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.  In the context of an aggregate 
settlement proposal, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics concluded that “the more 
disparate the claims included in an aggregate settlement proposal, the more likely it is that 
the proposal will run afoul of other provisions of the Model Rules,” including Rule 1.7 
(particularly (a)(2) and (b)(1)). ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 
438 (2006).  If these conflicts present consentability issues at the time an aggregate 
settlement proposal is made, when it may be too late or impractical for clients to obtain a 
new attorney, then surely they also present consentability issues at the outset of group 
representation, at least in those cases where an aggregate settlement proposal is a likely 
development. 
 91. Erichson, supra note 34, at 545; see also Silver & Baker, supra note 12, at 746–47. 
 92. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 29, § 14:37; Erichson, supra note 34, at 539–43. 
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act as a check on each other, providing greater scrutiny of both the total size 
of any aggregate settlement and the fairness of any proposed allocation to 
individual claimants. 
If there are viable means to obtain the benefits of group representation 
without forming a single group of unlimited size, then it is arguably 
unreasonable for a single lawyer or law firm to represent a limitless number 
of clients in a single mass tort.  After all, the smaller the group, the easier it 
will be for the attorney to maintain meaningful communication with 
individual clients, including obtaining their feedback as the representation 
progresses and counseling them when the time comes to accept or reject an 
aggregate settlement.93  Keep in mind that these are not, in fact, class 
actions; each claimant has a more-or-less traditional attorney-client 
relationship with the attorney, and it may be unreasonable to ask clients to 
agree to be treated no better than the absent members of a class.94  Of 
course, it will be difficult to draw lines in determining the appropriate size 
of a potential plaintiff group, but surely the group of 10,000 clients 
represented by Napoli Bern in the World Trade Center litigation was simply 
too big. 
Aside from the size of the group, it is questionable whether an attorney 
should be permitted to combine any and all claims in a single group, 
regardless of their conflicting nature.  For example, how is it reasonable for 
an attorney to combine a small number of high-value claims with a 
disproportionate number of claims with little or no value?  Attorneys who 
are not selective about the cases they take, accepting almost any case 
without regard to its merits, are usually hoping for a global settlement in 
which all claimants will receive something.95  It is certainly rational for 
clients with the weaker claims to opt for such group representation, as these 
are the claims that will be impossible to pursue individually, and low-value 
claims clearly benefit from their association with high-value claims.96  But 
what about the reverse situation?  Erichson acknowledges that high-value 
plaintiffs may rationally prefer individual representation, given that group 
representation tends to have a “damage-averaging effect, raising the value 
of weak claims and reducing the value of strong ones.”97  If so, then how is 
it rational for high-value plaintiffs to opt for group representation when the 
group includes a disproportionate number of weak claims?  Erichson does 
not address this question in any detail, arguing merely that many of such 
plaintiffs “maximize the value of their claims by litigating collectively,”98 
 
 93. See, e.g., RHEINGOLD, supra note 29, § 14:15 (noting the importance of adequately 
communicating with mass clients). 
 94. See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 34, at 577–78 (acknowledging the limits of his 
analogy of mass tort nonclass lawsuits to class actions, based on the ethical duties plaintiffs’ 
attorneys have to individual clients). 
 95. See id. at 549 n.115 (citing Judge Weinstein). 
 96. See id. at 551. 
 97. Id. at 552. 
 98. Id. at 564. 
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presumably by obtaining the benefits of cost sharing and enhanced leverage 
that result from collective representation. 
I agree that even high-value plaintiffs can benefit from group 
representation; however, there may be an alternative that Erichson has not 
considered:  participation in a smaller group comprised primarily of similar 
high-value claims.  Plaintiffs with weaker claims will likely obtain 
representation in one or more groups represented by different attorneys, and 
the attorneys representing all of these separate groups (high-value and low-
value) will be motivated to combine their resources and work together 
toward their common goals.  As a result, plaintiffs with high-value claims 
may have the opportunity to reap the benefits of large group representation 
(including the pooling of the resources of the combined groups) without 
incurring all the risks.  This is because, by participating as part of a smaller 
group, these plaintiffs will retain more control over their individual cases 
and more of the individual attention of their attorneys than they would as 
members of the largest possible group. 
In considering whether any particular group representation presents 
consentable conflicts, including whether a limited scope representation 
under Rule 1.2(c) is reasonable, we should also consider whether the clients 
will continue to be represented by separate attorneys, who presumably can 
assist the client in deciding whether to accept any offer of settlement, 
whether in an individual case or an aggregate settlement.  Referring 
attorneys might perform this limited role, but only if they will retain a 
significant role in keeping abreast of the developing litigation and 
consulting with the client concerning significant developments.99  In the 
absence of referring attorneys, a group attorney could provide access to 
independent counsel for purposes of advising individual clients on any 
aggregate settlement offer.100 
Even Erichson has acknowledged that “[s]erious inter-subgroup conflicts 
. . . may be disqualifying and unwaiveable,” but he does not elaborate or 
 
 99. Most jurisdictions require referring lawyers to participate in the representation or 
assume joint responsibility if they expect to share in the legal fees. See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.5(e) (2012).  Some jurisdictions, however, permit referring lawyers to 
share in the fees even if they do nothing more than refer the case to another lawyer. See, e.g., 
ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e) (2012) (restricting the dividing of fees in 
contingent fee matters is limited to disclosure to the client, so long as total fee is not clearly 
excessive). 
 100. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Meadows, Nos. A094750, A095475, 2002 WL 31033065, at 
*1 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2002) (describing a retention agreement that advised clients 
that, in the event of an aggregate lump sum settlement, there would be conflicts between the 
clients as to the size of each share and that clients could consult with or hire another lawyer 
in such event); cf. Brophy, supra note 16, at 692–93 (suggesting the possible use of 
independent attorneys to advise claimants in waiving their rights under the aggregate 
settlement rule).  Given the difficulty of identifying a separate lawyer who will be 
sufficiently informed to provide such advice at a reasonable fee, it would be more useful if 
the common attorney offered to provide access to such a lawyer.  If there are large numbers 
of clients who want to take advantage of such an opportunity, it will be difficult to find 
separate lawyers who are not themselves conflicted as a result of agreeing to advise multiple 
clients with differing interests. 
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suggest when this will occur.101  The most obvious instances of this type of 
conflict probably arise subsequent to the acceptance of multiple 
representations, as the representation is evolving.  These situations will be 
discussed in a later section. 
4.  Obtaining the Clients’ Informed Consent 
It is generally believed that mass tort plaintiffs’ attorneys rarely obtain 
their clients’ informed consent to multiple representation, either because 
they do not recognize a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7 or because they 
are skeptical of the “usefulness and enforceability of client waivers.”102  
Apparently expressing such skepticism, Paul Rheingold, an experienced 
mass tort plaintiffs’ attorney, concludes that “[p]erhaps the most that can be 
expected of a lawyer is that clients are informed that the lawyer is 
undertaking multiple representation, along with seeking [their] consent.”103 
But such a limited disclosure is clearly insufficient.  The Model Rules 
define “informed consent” as “the agreement by a person to a proposed 
course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information 
and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available 
alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.”104  With respect to conflicts 
of interest, the comment to Rule 1.7 states that “[i]nformed consent requires 
that each affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances and of the 
material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have 
adverse effects on the interests of that client.”105 
Erichson advocates disclosure that is more detailed than Rheingold’s 
proposed disclosure but is still rather sparse.  According to Erichson, clients 
should be informed that the lawyer represents a large number of similarly 
situated plaintiffs and “that such collective representation offers a number 
of advantages that benefit the plaintiffs as a group, but may involve trade-
offs that do not work to the advantage of each plaintiff individually.”106  
The attorney should further advise that “[p]otential conflicts may arise 
between group interests and the client’s individual interests, and that the 
lawyer intends to resolve such conflicts in favor of pursuing group 
interests.”107  Erichson concludes that, ideally, an agreement should explain 
“the types of inter-plaintiff conflicts that may arise during the litigation,”108 
but he generally approves of the disclosure in individual retention 
provisions such as the following provision described in a recent mass tort 
case: 
 
 101. Erichson, supra note 34, at 565. 
 102. See id. at 562; see also, e.g., Brickman, supra note 47, at 891–92. 
 103. RHEINGOLD, supra note 29, § 14:3. 
 104. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2012). 
 105. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 18. 
 106. Erichson, supra note 34, at 562–63. 
 107. Id. at 563. 
 108. Id. at n.158. 
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Attorneys may represent other persons damaged by the [toxic chemical] 
releases mentioned herein and Client understands that such multiple 
representation has advantages, but also may give rise to potential conflicts 
of interest of which Client is hereby advised.  Each person’s recovery may 
depend on factors such as age, severity of injury, extent of medical 
treatment, amount and duration of exposure, and pre-existing health 
condition.  Despite such potential conflicts of interest Client believes that 
the advantages of multiple representation outweigh any potential 
disadvantage and hereby waives any and all conflicts of interest that may 
arise from such multiple representation.109 
In addition to providing some detail concerning the client-client conflicts, 
Erichson also suggests that the attorney should explain the limitation on the 
scope of the representation as a collective, rather than an individual, 
representation.110 
According to a formal opinion of the ABA Standing Committee on 
Ethics, in cases where it is foreseeable at the outset that the attorney will 
negotiate an aggregate settlement, a mass tort plaintiffs’ attorney should 
also advise clients about the risks inherent in such settlements, including 
differences in the clients’ willingness to accept a settlement and the 
possibility that an offer may require the consent of all of the clients, in 
which case the failure to obtain unanimous consent may result in the 
withdrawal of the offer.111  The opinion also concludes that the attorney 
should further disclose the possibility that disclosure of confidential client 
information may be necessary in order to effectuate an aggregate 
settlement.112 
In my view, a plaintiffs’ attorney must disclose as much detailed 
information as is reasonably necessary to make the clients understand the 
material risks of the type of group representation the attorneys anticipate 
providing.  Given that personal injury clients are often unsophisticated and 
inexperienced users of lawyers, plaintiffs’ attorneys should not assume that 
a brief and summary type of disclosure, such as that provided in the case 
referenced by Erichson, will suffice.  Attorneys should inform clients of the 
approximate size of the expected group, as well as the range of diverse 
interests the attorney is likely to represent.  They should explain how group 
representation differs from individual representation and give some specific 
examples of how the clients’ interests might be adversely affected.  
Moreover, since it will be extremely difficult for clients to withdraw from 
 
 109. Id. at 563, n.159 (quoting Ferguson v. Meadows, Nos. A094750, A095475, 2002 
WL 31033065, at *1 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2002)).  The agreements in Ferguson also 
noted that, in the event of an aggregate lump sum settlement, there would be conflicts 
between the clients as to the size of each share and that the clients could consult with or hire 
another lawyer in such an event. Ferguson v. Meadows, Nos. A094750, A095475, 2002 WL 
31033065, at *1 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2002). 
 110. Erichson, supra note 34, at 563. 
 111. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 438 (2006); see also 
Garretson, supra note 34, at 23–24. 
 112. Id.  For a discussion of what needs to be disclosed pursuant to the aggregate 
settlement rule, see infra Part II. 
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the group and obtain individual representation once an aggregate settlement 
offer is negotiated, it is critical that clients be advised of the material risks 
of an aggregate settlement well in advance of the negotiation of such a 
settlement.  In addition to the disclosures advocated by the ABA Standing 
Committee on Ethics,113 attorneys should inform clients of the difficulty the 
attorneys may have giving each client independent advice whether to accept 
a settlement offer in the likely event that the settlement requires either total 
or near-total agreement by all of the clients.  Indeed, it may be necessary to 
inform clients that, in the event of such an aggregate settlement offer, they 
may need to consult separate counsel to help them decide whether to accept 
or reject their individual offer.114  The inability of the lawyer to provide 
independent and meaningful advice to individuals considering an aggregate 
settlement offer may also be part of the express limitation on the scope of 
the representation, under Rule 1.2(c), in which case this information is 
critical to clients deciding whether to enter into a limited scope 
representation.115 
As for clients with high-value claims, they should arguably be informed 
of their status (when reasonably ascertainable) and of the particular risk of 
damage-averaging that is more likely when a single lawyer represents both 
high and low-value claims.116  It may be especially important for clients 
with potentially high-value claims to have access to independent counsel at 
various points in the litigation, particularly when they are considering 
whether to accept an aggregate settlement offer.  As a result, whenever an 
aggregate settlement is reasonably foreseeable, a plaintiffs’ attorney should 
advise these clients of the prospect that they may want to consult 
independent counsel, because this information might influence them to 
explore alternative forms of representation before retaining this particular 
group lawyer. 
B.  Conflicts That Arise During the Representation 
As noted earlier, there may be some situations involving multiple 
representation where a plaintiffs’ attorney reasonably believes that the 
representation of each client will be individual until either the plaintiffs’ or 
defendant’s attorney decides to treat the clients as a group, as will certainly 
occur if either one initiates negotiation of an aggregate settlement.117  At 
that time, if not before, Rule 1.7(a) will be triggered, and the plaintiffs’ 
 
 113. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 114. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.  Such a disclosure is more useful than 
the provision in the engagement agreement in Ferguson, in which the attorney informed 
clients that, in the event of an aggregate settlement, they could consult independent counsel, 
but failed to inform them why it might be necessary for them to do so. See Ferguson, 2002 
WL 31033065, at *1. 
 115. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text (discussing how mass tort group 
representation functions as an express limitation on the scope of the representation). 
 116. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
 117. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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attorney must proceed in the same way as if the conflict of interest had 
arisen at the outset of the representation.118 
Aside from these situations, other events may occur that either trigger the 
need to seek newly informed consent or render the conflict nonconsentable.  
For example, the group may turn out to be far larger than the attorney 
originally anticipated.  At some point, a client who was previously advised 
that the group was likely to be in the hundreds will reasonably want to 
know that the group is now in the thousands, given that such an expansion 
may materially alter the client’s willingness to be part of such an extremely 
large group.  At the very least, the attorney should be required to 
communicate information concerning the size and diversity of the group as 
part of the attorney’s ongoing duty of communication,119 which requires 
significantly more information than would be the case when an attorney 
represents a class.120 
Sometimes an attorney has an opportunity to accept new clients after a 
lump sum settlement has been negotiated with the defendant but before it 
has been presented to the attorney’s existing clients for their approval.121  
The acceptance of these new clients may require renegotiating the lump 
sum amount, with the resulting risk that the plaintiffs’ and defense attorneys 
will fail to reach agreement and the settlement will be scuttled.  Given a 
defendant’s obvious reluctance to renegotiate the total package, the more 
plausible result of accepting new clients at this point may be the dilution of 
the size of the shares the existing plaintiffs could have expected with the 
original group.  Arguably, this new conflict is nonconsentable because there 
is no apparent benefit to the existing plaintiffs of expanding the group at 
this point122 and the risks of material harm are serious.  At the very least, 
accepting new clients should require the attorney to obtain the informed 
 
 118. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 4 (2012). 
 119. See id. R. 1.4(a) (requiring a lawyer, inter alia, to “reasonably consult with the client 
about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished” and “keep the 
client reasonably informed about the status of the matter”). 
 120. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 6, at 162–64. 
 121. See, e.g., Authorlee v. Tuboscope Vetco Int’l, Inc., 274 S.W.3d 111, 116 (Tex. App. 
2008); In re N.Y. Diet Drug Litig., No. 700000/98, 2007 WL 969426, at *1–5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Mar. 27, 2007); Brickman, supra note 47, at 859 (arguing that “law firms that represent large 
numbers of asbestos claimants and that recruit new claimants who will be actively 
competing for limited resources simultaneously with the firms’ current clients are violating 
Model Rule 1.7 if they fail to secure the informed consent of the new clients and current 
clients with pending claims to the conflicts of interest”). 
 122. Sometimes the attorney will not be accepting new clients but rather will be adding to 
the settlement previously existing clients who have been newly diagnosed with a disease that 
makes them eligible to participate in the settlement.  It is difficult to discern the precise 
ethical issue raised in such a scenario, especially if the attorney has already recognized a 
conflict of interests and obtained the informed consent of all of the clients at the outset of the 
representation.  Perhaps this is merely one of many ways in which the potential differences 
among the clients may adversely affect the representation of some of them.  It may not be 
possible for an attorney to disclose all of the ways in which harm may be anticipated; 
nevertheless, the more specific examples the attorney can give as part of the initial informed 
consent process, the more likely it is that the clients’ consent will be upheld in any 
subsequent challenge. 
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consent of the existing clients because their original consent cannot 
reasonably be interpreted to include such an unexpected event.123 
In the World Trade Center litigation, Judge Hellerstein was presented 
with yet another type of conflict that either arose or worsened sometime 
after Napoli Bern accepted the representation of close to 10,000 plaintiffs.  
Among these plaintiffs were fifty-nine persons who had previously made 
claims to, and received recoveries from, the legislatively established Victim 
Compensation Fund (VCF).  The legislation establishing this fund provided 
that any person making a claim to the fund “waives the right to file a civil 
action . . . in any Federal or State court for damages sustained as a result of 
the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.”124  When 
Napoli Bern negotiated an aggregate settlement with the defendants, it 
agreed to a provision that excluded “any Plaintiff who received an award 
from the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.”125  When some of 
the fifty-nine plaintiffs complained at public meetings that they wanted to 
be included in the settlement, Judge Hellerstein raised with Napoli Bern the 
need for these plaintiffs “to be advised whether to try and opt into the 
settlement, whether to not opt into the settlement, whether to voluntarily 
dismiss their cases or to proceed with their cases.”126  Napoli Bern 
suggested that it might opt out these fifty-nine plaintiffs (without consulting 
them), but then retreated when the defendants’ counsel argued that these 
individuals had no right to accept or reject the settlement.127  Judge 
Hellerstein determined that the fifty-nine plaintiffs needed independent 
counsel and eventually appointed one to represent them, at Napoli Bern’s 
expense when Napoli Bern failed to voluntarily engage such a lawyer.128 
Judge Hellerstein’s actions suggest he believed that the conflict of 
interest affecting the fifty-nine plaintiffs was nonconsentable.  Clearly the 
position of these plaintiffs was now “fundamentally antagonistic” to the 
other plaintiffs, all of whom were eligible to participate in the settlement.129  
 
 123. This situation should be distinguished from one where the lawyer is in the process of 
accepting new clients at the outset of a representation, in which the clients will be informed 
that the attorney anticipates accepting subsequent clients to form the expected group. 
Arguably, new clients may be accepted without revisiting the existing clients’ informed 
consent up until the time that any aggregate settlement is negotiated, because this is in line 
with the clients’ expectations.  It is a significantly different situation when new clients are 
added after an aggregate settlement has been negotiated, because this is both outside the 
existing clients’ expectations and significantly harmful to them. 
 124. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 769 F. Supp. 2d 650, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 654. 
 127. Id. at 653. 
 128. Id. at 654. 
 129. See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text.  According to Judge Hellerstein:   
If the 59 Plaintiffs were admitted to the SPA, as many of them requested, the final 
settlement amount would be spread thinner, affecting in particular the most 
severely injured Plaintiffs . . . whose recoveries were variable and dependent on 
how much of the fixed settlement amount would remain after the less severely 
injured Plaintiffs had been paid . . . .  Further, litigating the eligibility of the 59 
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Was this conflict nonconsentable from the outset?  Perhaps it was, although 
it is unclear that the differences between these plaintiffs and the other 
plaintiffs were more significant than the differences between plaintiffs who 
could not identify any objective manifestation of any injury, serious or 
otherwise, arguably related to work at the World Trade Center site and the 
remainder of the plaintiffs who had sustained such injury.130  Certainly, the 
defendants had an excellent argument that the VCF litigation rendered the 
fifty-nine plaintiffs ineligible to litigate, but it was not obvious from the 
outset that the defendants would insist on excluding them from any 
settlement.  In any event, once the issue arose whether the fifty-nine 
plaintiffs could participate in the negotiated settlement, it was clear that 
Napoli Bern could not properly advise them on their options at that time.131 
II.  SATISFYING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
CURRENT AGGREGATE SETTLEMENT RULE 
Despite much discussion among courts, mass tort practitioners, and 
commentators concerning the aggregate settlement rule,132 questions remain 
concerning the application of the current rule to particular circumstances.  
The questions include defining what constitutes an aggregate settlement, 
determining what particular information needs to be disclosed to all 
participating clients, and the effect of a rule variation in some jurisdictions 
in which there is a suggestion that the rule does not apply at all when a 
court has approved the settlement. 
 
Plaintiffs could have delayed and prejudiced the entire settlement, and therefore 
prejudiced the expectations of many for timely realization of their settlements, 
which were to provide funds to pay for medical and other necessities. 
World Trade Center, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 652.  Interestingly, however, Judge Hellerstein 
stated that once the fifty-nine plaintiffs had been advised concerning “‘their respective rights 
and options with regard to continuing in this litigation,’” they would be free to remain with 
Napoli if “after full disclosure and discussion,” both the clients and Napoli henceforth would 
be able to provide zealous and conflict-free representation to each client. Id. at 654. 
 130. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 185, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (stating that “[a]pproximately a third of the Plaintiffs had little or no objective injury 
traceable to their work at the WTC site”).  Other plaintiffs faced difficulties proving a causal 
relation with toxins at the WTC site, while others had “serious and lasting ailments strongly 
related to work at the WTC.” Id. 
 131. A similar issue was presented in an IMC settlement of separate lawsuits of more than 
850 plaintiffs who claimed to have suffered harm as a result of living near a fertilizer plant. 
The defendants insisted on settling these claims as part of a broader class action and further 
demanded that only plaintiffs who lived within a mile of the plant could be part of the 
settlement class.  The plaintiffs’ attorneys represented twenty-two plaintiffs who lived more 
than one mile from the plant.  These plaintiffs ended up in a better situation than the fifty-
nine plaintiffs in the World Trade Center case because the defendant was willing to settle 
with them individually, outside class action.  It is unclear whether they were better or worse 
off being in or out of the class. See Lewis F. Powell III, Class Settlement of Mass Tort Cases, 
7 SEDONA CONF. J. 259 (2006). 
 132. See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text. 
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A.  What Is an Aggregate Settlement? 
Neither ABA Model Rule 1.8(g)133 nor its state equivalents134 define an 
aggregate settlement, and there has been considerable confusion over what 
constitutes a settlement subject to the requirements of that rule.  In 2005, 
Professor Erichson published an article in which he proposed that a 
settlement of a group of related claims is an aggregate settlement for 
purposes of this rule whenever it involves some element of collective 
allocation of funds or a collective condition for the settlement to be 
effective.135  This definition has been adopted by the ABA Standing 
Committee on Professional Ethics136 and by the ALI in its Principles of 
Aggregate Litigation.137  Despite what appears to be a growing consensus 
around this definition,138 there continues to be confusion and controversy 
over what constitutes an aggregate settlement.  For example, in 2005, an 
Oregon State Bar Formal Ethics Opinion appeared to limit its definition of 
an aggregate settlement to “all or nothing” proposals,139 and that opinion 
continues to be cited as a plausible basis for determining when the rule will 
be triggered.140 
In 2008, a Texas Court of Appeals decision held that a settlement of the 
claims of 176 plaintiffs was not subject to the aggregate settlement rule 
even though the defendants’ attorney communicated to the plaintiffs’ 
attorney that, so long as the individual demands did not exceed $45 million, 
he would recommend to his clients and their insurance carriers that they 
settle the claims but only if 95 percent of the plaintiffs’ agreed.141  Relying 
on this statement, the plaintiffs’ attorney calculated individual settlement 
amounts for each plaintiff and sent the defendant a letter detailing an offer 
 
 133. Model Rule 1.8(g) provides: 
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an 
aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an 
aggregated settlement agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each 
client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client.  The lawyer’s 
disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved 
and of the participation of each person in the settlement. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2012). 
 134. Minor changes were made to Rule 1.8(g) in 2002. 51 Laws. Man. On Prof. Conduct 
(ABA/BNA) 375 (2012).  Almost all jurisdictions follow the language of either the current 
or the pre-2002 version of Model Rule 1.8(g). Id.  For a discussion of jurisdictions that 
provide an exception for court-approved settlements, see infra Part II.C. 
 135. See Erichson, supra note 11, at 1785–93. 
 136. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’ Responsibility, Formal Op. 438 (2006). 
 137. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.16 (Proposed 
Final Draft 2009); see also id. at reporters’ notes cmt. a (acknowledging that “[t]he terms 
‘conditionality’ and ‘allocation’ were first used by Professor Erichson in his Notre Dame 
article”). 
 138. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Bar Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 6 (2009) 
(adopting definition in ABA Op. 438); Moore, supra note 16, at 396. 
 139. See Or. State Bar Bd. of Governors, Formal Op. 158, at 433 (2005).  For a discussion 
of “all or nothing” proposals, see generally Erichson, supra note 7. 
 140. See Fucile, supra note 11, at 299. 
 141. Authorlee v. Tuboscope Vetco Int’l, Inc., 274 S.W.3d 111, 113, 116 (Tex. App. 
2008). 
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of settlement based on the numbers he calculated.  The court defined an 
aggregate settlement as occurring “when an attorney, who represents two or 
more clients, settles the entire case on behalf of those clients without 
individual negotiations on behalf of any one client.”142  The court then 
found that there were individual negotiations in that case because settlement 
demands were made on behalf of each plaintiff based on factors specific to 
each of their claims.143 
As recently as 2011, a practitioner published an article contending that 
the rule is clearly triggered only by all or nothing settlements and lump-sum 
settlements in which the plaintiffs’ attorney has the sole authority to make 
allocations to the clients.144  In the face of continuing uncertainty,145 this 
same practitioner recommends that the rule can likely be avoided by giving 
individual claimants the ability to opt out (even if the amounts were 
collectively negotiated), negotiating on individual claims (even though the 
defendant clearly has a bottom line total sum in mind), and obtaining 
judicial approval (even in jurisdictions whose version of Rule 1.8(g) 
contains no express exception for court-approved settlements).146 
Although there continues to be support for less comprehensive 
approaches to defining an aggregate settlement, in my view the definition 
adopted by the ABA and the ALI, based on Erichson’s proposal,147 
provides the most appropriate trigger for determining when to apply the 
requirements of Rule 1.8(g).  This approach is the most defensible because 
it alone takes into account the underlying purpose of the rule, which is to 
identify all situations in which there is a significant element of 
interdependence among the various claims, resulting in the need for 
claimants to obtain the information they need to know in order to assess the 
horizontal equity of the settlement allocations.148 
B.  The Disclosure Requirements of Rule 1.8(g) 
Model Rule 1.8(g) provides that in order to obtain the clients’ informed 
consent to an aggregate settlement, the lawyer must disclose to each client 
“the existence and nature of all the claims . . . involved and of the 
participation of each person in the settlement.”149  This or similar language 
 
 142. Id. at 120. 
 143. Id. at 121. 
 144. See generally Fucile, supra note 11. 
 145. See also Conn. Informal Ethics Op. 08-01 (finding that the Vioxx settlement was not 
an aggregate settlement because the participants had not voluntarily decided to engage in 
group representation). 
 146. Fucile, supra note 11, at 303; see also Komitor, supra note 33 (assuming that 
individual negotiations may avoid finding of aggregate settlement, even if the defendant has 
walk-away rights and even if the defendant is keeping tabs on the total amount of 
settlement). 
 147. See supra notes 133–37 and accompanying text. 
 148. See Erichson, supra note 11, at 1820. 
 149. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2012). 
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has been adopted in almost all jurisdictions.150  According to an ABA 
formal opinion, the rule requires the lawyer to disclose, at a minimum:  
(1) the total amount of the aggregate settlement; (2) the existence and nature 
of all claims involved in the settlement; (3) the details of every other 
client’s participation in the settlement; (4) the total fees and costs to be paid 
to the lawyer; and (5) the method by which costs are to be apportioned 
among the clients.151  Not all of these details are specified in the rule itself, 
and not all authorities agree that all of these facts must be disclosed;152 
nevertheless, these facts appear to be the type of information that claimants 
typically need in order to evaluate the fairness of both the total sum 
involved and its allocation among the various participants.  Moreover, to 
the extent that some of these details are not expressly required by the rule 
itself (including, for example, the attorney’s fee and the allocation of costs, 
such as those already advanced by the attorney), their disclosure is likely 
required by other rules, such as Rules 1.4 (communication of information 
reasonably required to make an informed decision)153 and 1.5 (detailing the 
disclosures required in connection with contingent fees).154  As a result, 
disclosing this information should not prove to be controversial.  What is 
controversial, however, is the question of whether the rule requires the 
disclosure of the names and other identifying information of each client 
(coupled with the amount each such client is to receive), and whether the 
rule permits aggregate settlements to be based on the use of formulas and 
matrices, in which case the amount to be allocated to each client will be 
unknown at the time that the settlement is approved by the clients. 
Courts and commentators have disagreed whether the current rule 
requires the disclosure of the names and other identifying information of 
each client participating in the settlement.  In a 1985 opinion, the Texas 
Court of Appeals stated that the common attorney must provide “a list 
showing the names and amounts to be received by the other settling 
 
 150. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.  One exception is California, in which 
the analogue to Rule 1.8(g) provides merely that a lawyer who represents two or more clients 
“shall not enter into an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients without 
the informed written consent of each client.” CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-310(D) 
(2012). 
 151. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Formal Op. 438 (2006). 
 152. See, e.g., infra at notes 155–77 and accompanying text (discussing a disagreement 
concerning the necessity of disclosing the names and other identifying information of each 
claimant participating in the settlement). 
 153. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (“A lawyer shall explain a matter 
to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding 
the representation.”). 
 154. See id. R. 1.5(c) (providing, in part, that “[a] contingent fee agreement shall be in a 
writing signed by the client and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, 
including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of 
settlement, trial or appeal; litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; 
and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated 
. . . .  Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a 
written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the 
remittance to the client and the method of its determination”). 
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plaintiffs.”155  Subsequently, in a 1989 opinion, the Supreme Court of South 
Carolina similarly required that the clients’ names be revealed because 
“[w]ithout knowing the identity of all participants and the amount each will 
receive, a client may not be able to detect irrelevant factors which may have 
affected the determination of the amount of recovery a given client is to 
receive.”156  Other courts have not expressly required that client names be 
disclosed, but they have suggested that this level of detail may be required, 
stating generally that clients must be “thoroughly advised of the particulars 
of the proposed settlement”157 or that the lawyer must provide “full 
information” about the proposed settlement to each client.158  On the 
contrary, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held in 2004 that, although the 
plaintiffs in a legal malpractice action were entitled to discovery of all 
documents pertaining to the allocation of a lump-sum settlement by an 
attorney representing thirty-one diet-drug plaintiffs, the trial court should 
permit the defendant “to redact all information specifically identifying the 
plaintiffs (i.e., name, address, etc.),” and should further require the other 
defendant to provide the plaintiffs with a chart listing the other plaintiffs, 
without identifying information, and containing instead:  “(1) the medical 
diagnosis, (2) additional information, if any, which affected the amount of 
settlement, and (3) the amount of settlement.”159 
Commentators have similarly disagreed as to whether plaintiffs must 
reveal the names of all clients who will participate in an aggregate 
settlement.  Professors Charles Silver and Lynn Baker contend that such 
information is required, which is one reason they have urged reform of the 
current rule.160  That also appears to be the position taken by the ALI in the 
Principles of Aggregate Litigation.161  Others, including myself, have urged 
that the current rule can and should be interpreted to exclude the need to 
require client names in all instances, particularly in mass tort litigation.162 
Given that the rule does not expressly require the disclosure of 
identifying information such as client names, I continue to believe that the 
better interpretation is that plaintiffs’ attorneys are not required to disclose 
such information unless it is necessary for the plaintiffs to evaluate the 
fairness of the allocation process.  Clients have legitimate privacy interests 
in the amount they will receive in an aggregate settlement, particularly 
 
 155. Quintero v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 709 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). 
 156. In re Anonymous Member of the S.C. Bar, 377 S.E.2d 567, 568 (S.C. 1989). 
 157. Bailey v. Sonnier (In re Sonnier), 157 B.R. 976, 980 n.11 (E.D. La. 1993). 
 158. In re Faucheux, 818 So. 2d 734 (La. 2002); see also In re Hoffman, 883 So. 2d 425, 
433 (La. 2004) (stating that a lawyer must fully disclose all details of a proposed settlement). 
 159. Williamson v. Edmunds, 880 So. 2d 310, 321 (Miss. 2004). 
 160. Silver & Baker, supra note 12, at 759–60. 
 161. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.17(a) 
reporters’ note (2010).  Professor Silver was a co-reporter for the ALI project. 
 162. See Erichson, supra note 34, at 575; Garretson, supra note 34, at 34–35; Steve 
Baughman Jensen, Like Lemonade, Ethics Comes Best When It’s Old-Fashioned:  A 
Response to Professor Moore, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 215, 221 n.11 (1999); Moore, supra note 6, 
at 162–64; Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class 
Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747, 767–68 (2002). 
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when that amount is extremely high.163  When the clients know each other, 
finding out who got what may well be important, because the clients will 
have (or can easily obtain) the background information necessary to 
monitor the settlement allocations.164  But in most mass tort litigation, there 
are many plaintiffs who do not know each other.  In such cases, learning the 
other clients’ names is unlikely to provide any useful information.165  
Rather, it should be sufficient for plaintiffs’ attorneys to comply with the 
disclosure required by the Mississippi Supreme Court, including disease 
categories, degrees of injury, and any other information pertinent to the 
settlement allocation, without the need to reveal the clients’ names.166 
In Scamardella v. Illiano,167 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
addressed the issue of disclosing client names in a somewhat different 
context.168  There, the court upheld an aggregate settlement despite the fact 
that the plaintiffs were not given a list with the names and amounts to be 
received by the other settling plaintiffs.169  This was not a mass tort lawsuit, 
and the plaintiffs were well known to each other.170  The reason that the 
plaintiffs did not learn what each of them would be receiving was not 
because the plaintiffs’ attorney withheld such information, but rather 
because the settlement agreement did not make any allocation of the 
agreed-upon settlement amount.171  Rather, the plaintiffs agreed that they 
would attempt to agree on a division of the settlement, and if that effort 
failed, they would each hire separate lawyers and submit the problem to the 
court for resolution.172 
The allocation process involved in Scamardella is unlikely to work in a 
mass tort lawsuit, where it would be unrealistic to suppose either that 
 
 163. See, e.g., Garretson, supra note 34, at 33–34 n.54 (discussing a Venezuelan client 
who feared kidnapping if the amount of his settlement was disclosed).  I was recently 
involved as an expert witness in a case in which a widower did not want to disclose the 
multimillion dollar sums his minor children received in the settlement of their claim for the 
wrongful death of their mother.  The family lived modestly, and the children were unaware 
of their wealth.  The father was concerned that others might try to take advantage of the 
children if the size of their settlements was made public. 
 164. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 6, at 163 n.91 (using as an example the group of 
neighboring families in Woburn, Massachusetts, that hired a plaintiffs’ attorney to represent 
them in connection with the toxic chemical litigation that was the basis for the book A Civil 
Action). 
 165. See, e.g., Garretson, supra note 34, at 33 (“[C]lients typically do not know each 
other; the disclosure of a full name does very little to help a client determine whether he or 
she was treated fairly.”). 
 166. Garretson advises plaintiffs’ attorneys to disclose to clients the subcategories and 
objective criteria for individual distributions, as well as listing numbers or first names next to 
each subcategory. Id. 
 167. 727 A.2d 421 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999). 
 168. Id. at 423–24. 
 169. Id. at 423 (“No apportionment of the settlement proceeds among the parties was 
proposed.”). 
 170. Id. (describing the parties to the settlement as a woman’s estate, the woman’s 
daughter, and the woman’s in-laws). 
 171. Id. at 423–24. 
 172. Id. at 424. 
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numerous plaintiffs who are strangers to each other might agree on dividing 
a fixed sum settlement or that, in the absence of such an agreement, a court 
would be willing to make settlement allocations itself on the basis of 
evidence submitted to it by each claimant.  What is both realistic and 
increasingly common in mass tort litigation, however, is for a settlement 
agreement to provide not specific allocations, but rather a detailed process 
by which a lump-sum settlement amount will subsequently be allocated, 
usually on the basis of a specific formula or matrix and often by a neutral 
third person, such as a special master.173  Of necessity, the clients will not 
know the specific amounts they are to receive under the settlement at the 
time their informed consent is requested.174 
Despite the frequency with which such process settlements are occurring, 
there has been almost no discussion of their propriety under the current rule.  
One court recently held that the unavailability of information concerning 
how much each participant would receive made it impossible for the 
plaintiffs’ attorney to comply with the disclosure requirements of Rule 
1.8(g).175  In addition, although the Principles of the Law of Aggregate 
Litigation specifically provide that attorneys may disclose “the formula by 
which the settlement will be divided among all the claimants,” in lieu of 
permitting each claimant to review the settlements of all of the others,176 
the comment states that permitting the disclosure of formulas is a 
“modification” of the current disclosure requirement.177 
 
 173. See, e.g., In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-
1708, 2009 WL 5195841, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Dec. 15, 2009) (describing a settlement under 
which a special master would determine individual awards based on the allocation plan 
proposed by a committee of plaintiffs’ attorneys); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1657, 
2008 WL 3285912, at *2–3 (E.D. La. Aug. 7, 2008) (discussing objective criteria to be 
applied by an independent claims administrator, with automatic review by an independent 
Gates Committee and possible appeal to a Special Master); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 
424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 490–91 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (involving a complex claims administration 
process); In re N.Y. Diet Drug Litig., No. 700000/98, 2007 WL 969426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 
27, 2007) (describing the process by which the claimants would be placed in objective 
categories of severity of injury, economic status, relationship to the defendant’s acts, with 
allocation); In re Polybutylene Plumbing Litig., 23 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) 
(describing the claims administration process by which the plaintiffs would receive amounts 
sufficient to cover certain damages “plus some additional amount to be calculated in a 
formula to be approved by a special master”). 
 174. See Diet Drug Litig., 2007 WL 969426, at *5 (“[T]he ‘individual settlement 
amounts’ referred to in the “settlement agreement . . . did not exist at the time the agreement 
was entered into. . . .  [They] were not known at the time, they were to be subsequently 
determined in the process being challenged herein.”). But cf. Guidant Corp., 2009 WL 
5195841, at *2–3 (describing how, pursuant to guidance from plaintiffs’ steering committee, 
most claimants’ counsel were able to provide each claimant with an estimated base 
allocation or at least a range in which counsel estimated their settlement allocation would 
fall). 
 175. Tilzer v. Davis, Bethune & Jones, L.L.C., 204 P.3d 617, 629 (2009). 
 176. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.17(a) (2010). 
 177. Id. cmt. a; see also N.J. SUPREME COURT PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY RULES COMM., 
supra note 20, at 42 (describing how the options available for modification of N.J. Rule 
1.8(g) include modifying the rule to permit “disclosure of a formula by which the settlement 
will be allocated”). 
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As with client names, the current rule does not expressly require that an 
aggregate settlement allocate a particular sum to each client.  Rather, it 
merely provides that “[t]he lawyer’s disclosure shall include the existence 
and nature of all the claims . . . and of the participation of each person in the 
settlement.”178  True, the words “participation of each person in the 
settlement” could reasonably be interpreted to require that each client be 
advised of how much both the client and others will receive, but it could 
also be reasonably interpreted, in a more flexible manner, to permit a 
description of the process by which each person’s participation will result in 
the allocation of a particular sum.  Given that the rule drafters are unlikely 
to have specifically considered the propriety of process allocations, such as 
those using a formula or matrix, the rule should arguably be interpreted in a 
manner that furthers its underlying purposes.  
In Scamardella itself, the court noted that the attorneys’ failure to make 
the actual apportionment was not a failing but rather an advantage of the 
settlement, because it “preserved the representation from the major conflict 
of interest that occurs in aggregate settlement cases.”179  There, the 
plaintiffs’ attorney made no effort to determine how the lump-sum 
settlement would be allocated, whether by formula, matrix, or otherwise.180  
This is not typically the case in mass tort litigation, where the settlement 
agreement will likely set forth detailed information as to the basis for the 
subsequent allocations.  Unquestionably, when the plaintiffs’ attorney plays 
a significant role in determining the formula or other process by which the 
settlement will be allocated, the attorney is subject to some of the more 
important conflicts of interest among the differently situated plaintiffs.  
Nevertheless, articulating objective criteria for allocating the settlement 
minimizes the ability of the plaintiffs’ attorney to play favorites, and 
providing that a neutral third person will apply the criteria to individual 
cases further enhances the likelihood that the proceeds will be fairly 
allocated.  This is especially the case when each claimant will be provided 
the opportunity to present evidence to the neutral and to appeal any initial 
allocation to a reviewing entity. 
But can plaintiffs meaningfully evaluate the fairness of the allocation 
process if they will not learn what they will receive until the process is 
complete, which will be after the settlement agreement has been approved?  
In some cases, plaintiffs’ attorneys can provide information concerning a 
range in which individual settlement allocations are expected to fall,181 and 
doing so is likely to prompt a court to conclude that the clients’ consent is 
adequately informed.  When possible, providing such information should be 
required. 
 
 178. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2012). 
 179. Scamardella v. Illiano, 727 A.2d 421, 427 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999). 
 180. Id. 
 181. See, e.g., In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-
1708, 2009 WL 5195841, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 15, 2009). 
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Even if information concerning the range of an individual’s likely 
recovery is unavailable, it should be possible, even under the current rule, 
for disclosure of a detailed allocation process to substitute for information 
concerning the final allocation.  When the client has specific information 
about the criteria by which the allocations will be made, the client should be 
able to assess whether the process is fair, even when it is unclear how much 
the client will receive.  But what if the only information the client is given 
is that the plaintiffs’ attorney will make the allocations according to 
whatever the attorney believes is a fair allocation? Arguably this 
information is not sufficient for the client to determine that the allocation 
process will be fair, since the lawyer has divided loyalties and will be 
tempted to favor some clients over others.  Even if the allocations will be 
made by a neutral third person, such as a claims administrator or special  
master, the disclosure may be insufficient if the settlement agreement 
provides no information concerning the criteria by which the allocations are 
to be made. 
Perhaps the key to determining when disclosure of information 
concerning the allocation process may properly substitute for disclosure of 
information concerning individual allocations is whether there is adequate 
justification for performing the allocations only after the clients’ approval 
has been sought.  When a neutral decision maker will be applying objective 
factors or a formula only after the plaintiffs are given an opportunity to 
submit information concerning their individual cases—and maybe even an 
opportunity to appeal the initial result182—then delay makes sense because 
the claims administration costs will not be justified unless the plaintiffs 
have agreed in advance to submit themselves to the process.  On the other 
hand, if the plaintiffs’ attorney will be making the allocations, then the 
attorney should be required to make these allocations prior to seeking the 
plaintiffs’ approval; these legal services should not entail any additional 
cost to the plaintiffs because they are within the scope of the representation 
reasonably contemplated under the individual contingent fee agreements.  
Even in the case of a neutral decision maker, there is no apparent 
justification for delaying the development of the objective criteria for 
making the allocations until after the settlement is approved.183 
 
 182. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1657, 2008 WL 3285912, at *2–3 
(E.D. La. Aug. 7, 2008) (describing a settlement plan that entailed submissions by claimants 
to an independent claims administrator and possible appeals to an independent gates 
committee and then a special master; if the special master upholds a finding of ineligibility, 
claimants then have the opportunity to take their claim to trial). 
 183. In the implantable defibrillators settlement, it is unclear from the opinion whether 
the allocation formula was determined prior to individual claimants being requested to 
approve the settlement, as the settlement and allocation process (including the approval of a 
proposed allocation plan by a special master) were proceeding simultaneously on “parallel, 
yet interdependent, tracks.” Guidant Corp., 2009 WL 5195841, at *2. 
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C.  Court-Approved Settlements 
Model Rule 1.8(g), as enacted in 1983, contained no reference—either in 
the text of the rule or its comment—to the applicability of the rule to court-
approved settlements in class action lawsuits.184  Louisiana and North 
Dakota were the first two jurisdictions to address this question—each 
providing in the text of the rule that it did not apply in class actions.185 
Subsequently, in 2002, the ABA amended the comment to Rule 1.8(g) to 
provide:  “Lawyers representing a class of plaintiffs . . . may not have a full 
client-lawyer relationship with each member of the class; nevertheless, such 
lawyers must comply with applicable rules regulating notification of class 
members and other procedural requirements designed to ensure adequate 
protection of the entire class.”186  This comment was perhaps not as clear as 
it might have been, but it appeared to exclude the application of the rule 
only in class actions, in which courts are required to approve a proposed 
settlement only after determining that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, 
and adequate.”187  This makes sense because it is difficult, and often 
impossible, to obtain the informed consent of each class member prior to 
implementation of a settlement. 
More recently, however, another two jurisdictions—Ohio and New 
York—have adopted versions of Rule 1.8(g) that provide an exception in 
the text of the rule for court-approved settlements more generally.188  What 
little legislative history exists suggests that the sole basis for adopting such 
language was to clarify that the rule is not meant to apply to class 
 
 184. See Reporter’s Explanation of Changes, AM. BAR. ASS’N, http://www.american
bar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission/e2k_rule18rem.h
tml (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). 
 185. See LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2011) (“A lawyer who represents two 
or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or 
against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo 
contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, 
or a court approves a settlement in a certified class action.”); N.D. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2006) (“A lawyer who represents two or more clients, other than in 
class actions, shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or 
against the clients, or an aggregated agreement as to guilty pleas in a criminal case, unless, 
after consultation, including disclosure of the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas 
involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement, each client consents.”). 
 186. See Am. Bar Ass’n Ethics 2000 Comm., Report on the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Rule 1.8, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional
_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission/e2k_rule18.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) 
(showing a red-lined version of the rules amended by the ABA House of Delegates upon the 
recommendation of the Ethics 2000 Commission). 
 187. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 188. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2009) (“A lawyer who represents 
two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of 
or against the clients, absent court approval, unless each client gives informed consent in a 
writing signed by the client.” (emphasis added)); OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) 
(2007) (“A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an 
aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients . . . unless the settlement or 
agreement is subject to court approval or each client gives informed consent, in a writing 
signed by the client.” (first emphasis added)).  
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actions.189  Nevertheless, the adoption of such broad language suggests that 
the rule could be applied to exclude the application of any situation in 
which a court approves the settlement of a mass tort lawsuit, even in 
nonclass aggregate litigation.190 
In my view, such an interpretation would be unfortunate.  No law 
requires courts to approve nonclass aggregate settlements, except in special 
cases such as the participation of a minor.191  This is because it is assumed 
that the claimants’ attorneys are adequately protecting their interests.  True, 
some courts have reviewed nonclass aggregate settlements, claiming in at 
least one instance that judicial review was necessary because mass tort 
lawsuits are often litigated as if they were class actions, “with all of the 
thousands of lawsuits being litigated on a common basis under close 
judicial management at every stage.”192  These types of cases are 
increasingly being termed “quasi class actions,” in which courts not only 
review proposed settlements, but also exercise their equitable powers to cut 
back attorneys fees, as they had been negotiated in the individual retention 
agreements.193  Nevertheless, while some judges may involve themselves in 
the details of the litigation and review any proposed settlement in the same 
manner that they would review a proposed class settlement, this is not 
always the case.  Indeed, as others have noted, courts that have approved 
aggregate settlements often do so without necessarily conducting “any 
independent review of the fairness, reasonableness, or adequacy of the 
terms of the settlement or the process that led to the agreement.”194 
 
 189. See OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) cmt. 13 (“Alternatively, where a 
settlement is subject to court approval, as in a class action, the interests of multiple clients 
are protected when the lawyer complies with applicable rules of civil procedure and orders 
of the court concerning review of the settlement.”); id. at Comparison to ABA Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct (no mention of any differences between Ohio Rule 1.8(g) and ABA 
Model Rule 1.8(g)); see also ROY SIMON, SIMON’S NEW YORK RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT 379 (2012) (citing the reporters’ note suggestion “that the court approval 
exception would apply in situations ‘such as in class actions,’ reflecting the reality that 
individual consent to a class action settlement is rarely (if ever) obtained from every member 
of a class”). 
 190. See SIMON, supra note 189, at 379 (“Read literally . . . the ‘court approval’ exception 
[of the New York rule] also could be interpreted to open an avenue for converting ‘mass 
actions’ (multiple individual clients bringing related claims) into ‘class actions’ (allowing 
court approval to substitute for individual client consent).”). 
 191. See, e.g., PA. R. CIV. P. 2039 (“No action to which a minor is a party shall be 
compromised, settled or discontinued except after approval of the court pursuant to a petition 
presented by the guardian of the minor.”). 
 192. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 184, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (justifying the court’s role in exercising supervisory authority over nonclass settlement 
on the grounds that this mass action resembled, and was litigated like, a class action, “with 
all of the thousands of lawsuits being litigated on a common basis under close judicial 
management at every stage”). 
 193. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596, 06-CV-2592, 2009 
WL 5062109, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2009) (Judge Weinstein). 
 194. Willgang & Lee, supra note 3, at 802 (discussing court approvals of the Zyprexa and 
Vioxx settlements). 
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Even if a court interprets Rule 1.8(g) as inapplicable to any court-
approved settlement, it does not appear that this would significantly change 
what the plaintiffs’ attorney is required to do.  At the very least, the attorney 
must obtain the consent of each client before the settlement can be effective 
with respect to that client, not only because Rule 1.2(a) requires the attorney 
to do so,195 but also because courts have no authority to bind parties to a 
settlement in nonclass lawsuits.  In this respect, nonclass aggregation is 
significantly different from class actions.196  Moreover, once it is 
established that each client must consent to his or her settlement, Rule 1.4 
dictates that the attorney explain the settlement offer “to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions 
regarding the representation.”197  And all or most of the information 
currently required to be disclosed under Rule 1.8(g) is precisely the type of 
information that will be “reasonably necessary” for each client to decide 
whether to accept or reject a settlement offer.  Nevertheless, rejecting the 
application of the disclosure requirements under Rule 1.8(g) itself is 
probably a bad idea because it makes it less likely that attorneys will 
comply with their obligations under other applicable rules. 
Perhaps the only significance of excluding judicially approved 
settlements from the application of Rule 1.8(g) is to provide more flexibility 
in determining precisely what information a plaintiffs’ attorney must 
disclose.  If the aggregate settlement rule has been interpreted in a 
jurisdiction to require that the attorney disclose the names and addresses of 
all clients who are participating in the settlement, no matter how irrelevant 
this information would be to a client’s evaluation of the fairness of a 
particular settlement, then courts can decide that Rule 1.4, unlike Rule 
1.8(g), does not require the disclosure of such information in all cases.  
Similarly, if the aggregate settlement rule has been interpreted in a 
jurisdiction to require that formula and other process settlements are 
unlawful—because the attorney cannot disclose how much each client will 
receive at the time the clients are asked to consent to the settlement—then 
courts can decide that Rule 1.4 does not require the invalidation of these 
types of settlements, which are typically less subject to plaintiffs’ attorney 
manipulation than settlements in which the attorney plays a more 
substantial role in determining each plaintiff’s allocation. 
Many commentators have urged judges to be more active in protecting 
plaintiffs’ interests in mass tort litigation, for precisely the reasons that 
Judge Hellerstein gave in justifying his own “managerial” role in the World 
Trade Center litigation.  In my view, more judicial supervision may well be 
desirable, but what may be even more desirable is for judges to insist that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys fully comply with existing ethics rules, including not 
only Rule 1.8(g) but also Rules 1.2, 1.4, and 1.7—particularly Rule 1.7 as it 
 
 195. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 196. See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 34, at 524. 
 197. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
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relates to the size and the composition of any group represented by a single 
attorney or law firm. 
III.  ATTORNEY WITHDRAWAL FROM REPRESENTING 
NONSETTLING PLAINTIFFS 
In the Vioxx settlement, defense attorneys required plaintiffs’ attorneys to 
withdraw from representing nonsettling plaintiffs if they could do so 
without violating state equivalents of Model Rules 1.16 and 5.6.198  
Commentators have been nearly unanimous in condemning these—and 
other—provisions of the settlement on the grounds that plaintiffs’ attorneys 
who withdraw under these circumstances will violate both of these rules.199 
I agree that putting such a provision in a settlement agreement constitutes 
a violation of Rule 5.6, which prohibits lawyers from participating in 
“offering or making . . . an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s 
right to practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy.”200  Courts 
and ethics committees have uniformly held that a settlement agreement may 
not prohibit a plaintiffs’ attorney from representing new clients in lawsuits 
against the defendant; regardless of the defendant’s understandable desire to 
achieve finality, such agreements violate public policy by limiting the 
ability of new clients to find adequate representation.201  If it is unethical 
for a plaintiffs’ attorney to agree to turn away new clients, then how can it 
be ethical for the same attorney to agree to terminate the representation of 
existing clients?202  Perhaps some of these attorneys might decide for 
themselves that they want to withdraw, but the only reason for putting such 
a provision in a settlement agreement203 (i.e., a provision requiring all of 
the plaintiffs’ attorneys to withdraw from all of their nonsettling clients—
even if only when ethically permissible)204 is to satisfy the defendants’ 
 
 198. See supra notes 15, 24 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 201. Some commentators have disagreed with this policy and urged that the rule be 
changed, but this is clearly the result under the current rule. See Erichson & Zipursky, supra 
note 13, at 284–85. 
 202. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 371 (1993) 
(stating that a settlement agreement requiring the plaintiffs’ attorney to refuse to represent 
certain opt-out clients—whether they were clients at the time of the settlement or became 
clients thereafter—would violate Model Rule 5.6(b)). 
 203. I use the term “settlement agreement” because this is what they are typically called, 
but of course, under the existing aggregate settlement rule, there is no actual settlement 
agreement until the terms have been accepted by the requisite number of plaintiffs. Cf. 
Erichson, supra note 11, at 1793.  
 204. As Erichson and Zipursky have noted, another questionable provision in the Vioxx 
agreement was where the attorneys agreed that all disputes about interpretation and 
compliance were required to be decided by the chief administrator, who was to sit as a 
binding arbitration panel, and whose decision would be “final, binding and Non-
Appealable.” See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 13, at 291 n.115.  Moreover, the chief 
administrator was none other than “Judge Eldon Fallon, the federal district judge who 
presided over the Vioxx MDL and who played a major role in pushing the parties to settle.” 
Id. at 291 (footnote omitted). 
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desire to achieve finality by removing experienced plaintiffs’ attorneys 
from continuing to pursue this type of litigation,205 which defendants are 
not permitted to do under Rule 5.6. 
On the other hand, I am not convinced that the mandatory withdrawal 
provision necessarily violated Rule 1.16 as it has been interpreted in various 
jurisdictions.  That rule permits lawyers to withdraw when “the client 
insists upon taking action . . . with which the lawyer has a fundamental 
disagreement.”206  Although a lawyer may fundamentally disagree with a 
client’s decision to refuse an offer of settlement, many courts and ethics 
committees have found that a fundamental disagreement whether or not to 
settle a lawsuit is insufficient grounds to withdraw because it conflicts with 
the client’s absolute right to decide whether to settle a case.207  
Nevertheless, courts have not uniformly held that an attorney is prohibited 
from withdrawing or attempting to withdraw208 when a plaintiff in a 
contingent fee representation refuses to accept a settlement offer 
recommended by the attorney.  Although it may not be accurate that a 
majority of courts permit withdrawal in these circumstances (as a recent law 
review note asserted209), there are at least some jurisdictions where the 
Vioxx plaintiffs’ attorneys may have been ethically permitted to withdraw 
from representing nonsettling plaintiffs. 
For example, the Kentucky Supreme Court recently held that, although a 
trial court properly permitted a plaintiff’s attorney to withdraw from an 
individual lawsuit when the plaintiff refused an offer of settlement, the 
same attorney could not recover legal fees under quantum meruit.210  This 
 
 205. If they could require the plaintiffs’ attorneys to refuse to accept new clients, 
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deal with other plaintiffs’ attorneys who can be trusted to understand and honor the implicit 
agreement. 
 206. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2012). 
 207. See, e.g., Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 13, at 286–87 (collecting authorities). 
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CONDUCT R. 1.6(c).  Prior to filing the lawsuit, an attorney may withdraw without court 
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 209. See generally Jane Y. Kim, Note, Refusing To Settle:  A Look at the Attorney’s 
Ethical Dilemma in Client Settlement Decisions, 38 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 383 (2012). 
 210. See Lofton v. Fairmont Specialty Ins. Managers, Inc., 367 S.W.3d 593, 593–94 (Ky. 
2012).  With respect to the trial court’s permitting the attorney to withdraw, the Kentucky 
Supreme Court first noted that trial courts have “broad discretion in granting such 
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made under subsections (3) [client insisting on pursuing an objection the lawyer considers 
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was because “good cause” for purposes of permissive withdrawal is not the 
same as “good cause” for quantum meruit compensation.211  In addition, the 
court stated that the attorney might even have recovered under quantum 
meruit if he had put a provision in the engagement agreement permitting 
him to withdraw if the plaintiff refused the attorney’s recommendation to 
settle the case.212  Given that the Vioxx plaintiffs’ attorneys were agreeing 
not to seek legal fees in cases involving nonsettling plaintiffs,213 their 
attempts to withdraw would apparently be perfectly proper in Kentucky and 
other jurisdictions as well.214 
Of course, for purposes of the Vioxx settlement, it is probably irrelevant 
whether the mandatory withdrawal provision necessarily violated Rule 
1.16, because it apparently violated Rule 5.6(b).215  As a result, it was 
unethical for both the defense and plaintiffs’ attorneys to agree to that 
 
repugnant or imprudent], (5) [representation resulting in unreasonable financial burden on 
the lawyer or rendered unreasonably difficult by the client], and (6) [other good cause] of 
that Rule.” Id. at 596.  Although this was not necessarily a ringing endorsement of the ethical 
propriety of the attorney’s attempt to withdraw, it strongly suggests that attorneys may 
properly withdraw or attempt to withdraw under the Kentucky rules. 
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plaintiffs acquiesced in the lawyer’s withdrawal. Id. at 1088; see also Jiricko v. Ill. 
Anesthesia, Ltd., Nos. 92-2613, 92-2682, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 22030 (7th Cir. Aug. 27, 
1993) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a lawyer’s motion 
to withdraw where a contractual provision allowed the lawyer to terminate the 
representation; however, there was no settlement offer in that case, and the contract provided 
that the lawyer could withdraw if it should appear that the lawsuit “lacks merit or is 
otherwise not feasible to pursue”); Citibank, N.A. v. Accounting Sys. of P.R., Inc., No. 90-
1145, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 14377 (1st Cir. Aug. 7, 1990) (upholding a grant of permission 
to withdraw when the court determined that plaintiffs were solely responsible for proceeding 
to trial pro se because they expressed their dissatisfaction with the lawyer, demonstrated an 
unwillingness to cooperate with his plans, stated their intention to retain new counsel, and 
did not object to the withdrawal or ask for a continuance).  Even so, these jurisdictions have 
clearly not held that it is impermissible to request to withdraw following rejection of a 
settlement offer; therefore, it was certainly possible that the Vioxx plaintiffs’ attorneys could 
have permissibly withdrawn there.  Of course, it was also possible that the Vioxx plaintiffs’ 
attorneys could cite reasons other than the mere rejection of their advice to settle.  For a 
discussion of the permissibility of withdrawal on other grounds, see infra note 218 and 
accompanying text. 
 215. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
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provision.  What interests me, however, is a different question:  whether 
there are any circumstances in which plaintiffs’ attorneys can decide for 
themselves to withdraw or attempt to withdraw from representing 
nonsettling claimants in mass tort litigation. 
I agree with those courts and commentators who interpret Rule 1.16 to 
prohibit lawyers from withdrawing merely because the client has rejected 
the lawyer’s recommendation to accept a settlement offer.216  This 
interpretation appropriately recognizes that it is for the client, and not the 
lawyer, to accept or reject a settlement offer, and that an attorney’s 
withdrawal—or threat of withdrawal—prompted solely by the client’s 
settlement decision, constitutes an impermissible restriction on the client’s 
decision-making authority.217  I also agree with the view that attorneys may 
not circumvent this result by having clients consent in the engagement 
agreement to the attorney’s withdrawal under such circumstances.218 
On the other hand, there are some circumstances in which the presence of 
additional factors will allow a plaintiffs’ attorney to ethically withdraw 
from the representation after the plaintiff has rejected an offer of settlement.  
For example, if continued representation would result in an ethical 
violation, then the attorney is required to withdraw, or at least attempt to 
withdraw.219  This will be the case if the attorney’s investigation (including 
discovery) reveals that a nonsettling plaintiff’s lawsuit has no merit,220 
although this may be unlikely when the defendant has offered to settle the 
lawsuit with respect to this, as well as similarly situated plaintiffs.  
Continued representation is also prohibited when there is a conflict of 
interests between the settling and nonsettling plaintiffs, and either the 
conflict is nonconsentable or the clients refuse to give their informed 
consent.221  Erichson and Zipursky cite to several authorities suggesting this 
result, including instances involving only a few claimants in situations 
where there was insufficient coverage for all the claimants.222  Unless it is 
manifest that the defendant cannot pay all claims, however, it is unclear 
how the existence of nonsettling plaintiffs creates conflicts that are either 
nonconsentable or outside the informed consent that should have been 
 
 216. See, e.g., Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2008); Conn. Informal Op. 08-
01; Nathan M. Crystal, “Let’s Make a Deal”—Settlement Ethics, S.C. LAW., Nov. 2008, at 8; 
Sylvia Stevens, When a Client Repudiates a Settlement:  What Can You Do?, OR. ST. B. 
BULL., May 2008; see also authorities cited in 31 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 
107; cf. Best v. City of N.Y., No. 04CIV10114, 2005 WL 3071546 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 
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 218. See, e.g., Nehad, 535 F.3d at 971. 
 219. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (2012). 
 220. See FED R. CIV. P. 11; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1. 
 221. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7. 
 222. See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 13, at 286 & n.94 (citing N.C. State Bar Op. 
251 (1997); Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tenn., Formal Op. 95-F-
136 (1995); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 cmt. d(i), illus. 
2 (2000)). 
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obtained either at the beginning of the representation or sometime before 
the negotiation of the aggregate settlement.223 
What about an attorney’s belief that continued representation constitutes 
an “unreasonable financial burden,”224 given the cost of trial in individual 
cases and perhaps only the small or negligible prospect of obtaining a 
verdict that will cover the attorney’s costs?  Courts disagree whether 
withdrawal is permissive in such cases.  Some courts permit withdrawal on 
the grounds that the rule clearly states that “unreasonable financial burden” 
creates good cause to withdraw,225 but others disagree on the grounds that 
this is one of the risks that attorneys accept when they represent clients on a 
contingent fee basis.226  For some courts, the financial burden may be 
unreasonable only if it results from some totally unexpected event.227 
Some lawyers have attempted to deal with the problem by providing, in 
their retention agreements, that a contingency fee will be converted to an 
hourly fee if the client rejects a settlement recommended by the attorney.228 
Not surprisingly, most courts reject such provisions on the obvious ground 
that they unduly interfere with the client’s right to accept or reject a 
settlement offer.229  One commentator suggests that attorneys put a 
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 228. See, e.g., Compton v. Kittleson, 171 P.3d 172, 180 (Alaska 2007) (holding that such 
a “hybrid” fee agreement violated the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct). 
 229. See Crystal, supra note 216, at 9 (citing Compton, 171 P.3d 172).  The Compton 
court also expressed concern with the “predictable difficulty of forecasting the effects of the 
fee-conversion provision” given the number of variables involved in determining the effect 
that such a provision will have in any particular case. Compton, 171 P.3d at 179. 
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provision in their retention agreements permitting the attorney to decide at 
any time not to advance expenses, so long as the attorney provides the 
client with reasonable notice.230 
In my view, the more appropriate solution is to make use of the limited 
scope of the representation under Rule 1.2(c).231  In the case of clearly 
identified group representations, attorneys ought to be free to specify that, 
in the event there is no longer a sufficiently large group to warrant the costs 
of the litigation, the attorney will be permitted to withdraw, or the client 
will agree to pay the necessary expenses to pursue the client’s case.  Such a 
provision would bring home to the client some of the risks of group 
representation at a time when the client still has the option of searching for 
another attorney who is willing to provide a more traditional individual 
representation.  For high value claimants, who are the ones most likely to 
reject aggregate settlement offers,232 this particular disclosure might well 
prompt them to reevaluate whether they want to be part of a group 
representation in which the attorney is incapable of pursuing the client’s 
individual case should the client reject an unacceptable offer. 
I caution, however, that this solution should only be available in cases in 
which it is in fact unreasonably burdensome for a plaintiffs’ attorney to 
pursue litigation on the part of nonsettling claimants.233  This will not 
always be the situation in mass tort litigation, only some of which present 
the challenges of highly complex cases like Vioxx.  For example, in single 
event disasters, such as airplane crashes, the expenses of trying a single case 
may not be excessive, particularly if the common attorney has already 
completed all or most of the investigation, including the identification of 
expert witnesses. 
CONCLUSION 
Elsewhere I have criticized the ALI for failing to include, in its recent 
Principles of Aggregate Litigation, a meaningful discussion of the ethical 
issues that arise for lawyers in aggregate litigation, including both class 
actions and nonclass aggregations.234  My initial concern was that the ALI 
had missed an opportunity to give necessary and helpful guidance to both 
lawyers and courts concerning the ethical issues in aggregate litigation, 
including conflict of interest issues.235  In addition, however, I came to 
believe that, with respect to nonclass aggregations, such as commonly occur 
in mass tort litigation, the ALI did more than miss an opportunity to educate 
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mass tort lawyers regarding their ethical obligations—rather, it 
affirmatively downplayed both the risks of this type of group representation 
and the role of ethics rules in protecting individual clients against these 
risks.236  The result, I feared, was to indirectly approve the common 
practice of mass tort lawyers treating individual clients as if they were 
members of a class action but without affording them even the minimal 
judicial protections given to actual class members.237 
It has been my goal in this Article to initiate the sort of discussion I wish 
the ALI had engaged in before adopting the Principles of Aggregate 
Litigation.  With respect to conflicts of interest, I have attempted to identify 
when potentially impermissible conflicts arise under Rule 1.7(a)—including 
conflicts among current clients and conflicts between the clients and their 
lawyer—both from the outset of the representation and as the representation 
evolves, even before a defendant makes an aggregate settlement offer.  As 
for the consentability of such conflicts under Rule 1.7(b), I agree that the 
potential advantages of mass representation often outweigh the risks; 
however, I suggest that there ought to be some limitation on both the size 
and the composition of a group represented by a single lawyer or law firm.  
Finally, I argue that obtaining the clients’ informed consent requires more 
than a simple explanation that the representation will be collective, rather 
than individual, urging that lawyers disclose as much detailed information 
as is reasonably necessary for clients to understand the material risks of the 
type of group representation that the lawyer anticipates giving. 
With respect to the aggregate settlement rule itself, I address questions 
that continue to arise under the existing rule, including what constitutes an 
aggregate settlement, the type of information that must be disclosed to 
clients, and the effect of several state rules that may not require satisfaction 
of the rule when a court has approved the settlement.  I urge uniform 
adoption of the ALI’s definition of an aggregate settlement as one that 
involves an element of either collective allocation or a collective condition 
for the settlement to be effective.  I agree with others that detailed 
information concerning the allocation to each client is required, but I 
question whether this necessarily includes client names or other identifying 
information in situations where this information is unlikely to be useful in 
assessing whether the allocation is a fair one.  I am also concerned that a 
literal application of the aggregate settlement rule may prohibit the use of a 
formula or matrix, where the clients may not know the precise amount of 
their allocation before being asked to approve the settlement.  I agree that 
formula or matrix settlements can be abused, but they are often the most 
objective means of allocating settlement proceeds and therefore need to be 
accommodated under the existing rule.  Finally, for those state versions of 
the aggregate settlement that create an exception for court-approved 
settlements, I urge that these rules be interpreted to limit the exception to 
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court approval of class actions, given that other rules—such as Rules 1.2 
and 1.4—also require that lawyers provide adequate information to allow 
clients to decide whether to accept or reject a proposed settlement offer. 
The last section of the Article addresses the complicated question of 
when plaintiffs’ attorneys may withdraw from representation of a plaintiff 
who rejects a reasonable settlement offer.  I agree with others who condemn 
settlement agreements requiring plaintiffs’ attorneys to do so when ethically 
permitted; however, my concern is not that there are few, if any, 
circumstances in which such withdrawal is ethically permissible, but rather 
that defendants have no legitimate interest in forcing plaintiffs’ attorneys to 
withdraw, even if they could do so voluntarily.  As for entirely voluntary 
withdrawal, unlike many others, I am sympathetic to the economic realities 
of some mass tort representations, where it may not be feasible to force an 
attorney to litigate only one or a few claims when the anticipated expenses 
are enormous.  So long as the attorney provides advance warning, I believe 
that voluntary withdrawal can sometimes constitute a necessary aspect of a 
limited-scope group representation under Rule 1.2(c), although I concede 
that this conclusion will be controversial. 
I did not come to this Article with any particular theme in mind.  If there 
is a theme, it is that the issues are more complex than I initially thought 
they would be and that to adequately address the risks of mass 
representation—without losing its potential for enormous benefits—we 
need to take a nuanced approach to the application of the existing rules to 
factual situations that may vary considerably.  Nevertheless, it is imperative 
that mass tort lawyers take their ethical obligations seriously and that 
courts, commentators, and organizations such as the ALI continue to 
discuss these issues and provide as much guidance as they can to the 
practicing bar. 
